THE CAMPAIGN AFTER NOVEMBER 4

The Reporter

November 11, 1952 25c

Election Day

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An Electoral Map and Some Key Senate Contests

Cain



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

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



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

Moody

Lodge

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

THE REPORTER'S NOTES

Politics at Its Lowest

We never tire of saying it over and over again: Nothing has happened since June 25, 1950, that is so real, so fraught with destiny as the Korean War. There the Communist inflammation came to a head and broke, but the wound is still unhealed. The sample of what the future might have in store for other lands in the world, and possibly for the whole world, is to be found *there* and *now*. That is the spot where our containment theory is tested, not in diplomatic or propaganda maneuvers, but in the flesh of our soldiers, who have managed to contain Communism there.

Actually, not only diplomatic or strategic theories but even politics, even elections appear somewhat unreal, not worth all the shouting, when compared with Korea. Or, to put it differently, there is no better way these days of judging a candidate for high office than by sizing up his stand on Korea. If he shrinks, that's the test.

IN THIS issue we have two articles on Korea, one on the bloody military and political stalemate and the other on what the people of Korea are paying for it. Yet we feel that these articles, excellent as they are, are not enough, particularly since this is the last number of *The Reporter* we can bring out before the elections. In the course of the campaign Korea has become a partisan issue, and we think it's worth while giving a last, hard look at what is happening over there before stepping into the polling booth.

Korea shows in its crudest form what balance of power really means, with the advantages and disadvantages nearly equally distributed between both sides, ourselves and the enemy. The enemy tried to throw us off balance, and two or three times nearly succeeded. But there he is now—stuck just above the line he originally overran, and with an edge of territorial advantage lying with us.

At Panmunjom, the enemy has been peeling off the various layers of that thing, which we used to consider so compact, called peace. We have learned by now that a cease-fire is not necessarily conducive to a truce, that there is a long, long way between a truce and an armistice, and that there is an infinite distance between an armistice perceived as a dim prospect in the future and peace.

The masters of the Kremlin want it this way. It serves their interests well to keep our relationship with Red China on a target-practice basis where our soldiers are objectives for Mao's rifles, and vice versa, with no room left for diplomacy. A larger war would embarrass Soviet Russia just as much as the prospect of our arranging some kind of peace with Red China. Yet the chances for something short of peace—a cease-fire or a truce—remain largely dependent on the persuasive power of our blows.

THE Administration's record on Korea has been checkered. History will never forget the statesmanship of Harry Truman's decision on June 27, 1950. But too broad an authority was left to the military, particularly while MacArthur was in command. Above all, the Administration never succeeded in keeping the focus of national attention on Korea, where it belonged. And so the war there slipped into a routine, un-newsworthy affair that, even with the best reporting, could not easily be featured. The war communiqués were to be found regularly on page 2 of the New York *Times*—that great newspaper which feels it is its duty to publish all that's fit to print, particularly if it is not meant to be read.

AND THEN the Presidential campaign came—that campaign which so many of us thought, until the end of July, was going to be conducted on the highest level of patriotic responsibility because of the unusual stature of the two candidates. The pictures of wounded American soldiers in the Korean War, their faces streaming with blood and tears, became a constant front-page feature of the Scripps-Howard papers. Even the General felt that Korea could not be left in a nonpartisan limbo. It had to be dragged into the campaign. He said in Champaign, Illinois, on October 2: "There is no sense in the United Nations, with America bearing the brunt of the thing, being constantly compelled to man those front lines. That is a job for the Korean. We do not want Asia to feel that the white man of the West is his enemy. If there must be a war there, let it be Asians against Asians, with our support on the side of freedom."

He also felt compelled to give his partisan explanation of the no-war, no-peace condition that Russia had imposed on us, and in Houston, on October 15, he said: "We have had a peace which is not a peace; a war which is

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not a war; an armistice which is not an armistice.

"Why have we had these things? Because we have had an Administration in Washington which, in its foreign policy, has breathed first hot, then cold, then hot again." Yet these and many other declarations of the General—all developing the idea that if he is elected our soldiers will be brought home from Korea—are up to the highest standards of statesmanship when compared with what is being said on the Korean War by some of the people who support him. Some of them have even spread the alarm that the Administration might be concocting an armistice before the election.

WE ARE inclined to be rather hard-boiled when it comes to judging a Presidential campaign. Of course, to gain the farmers' vote a candidate has to come out for something like parity —even two hundred per cent of parity, if he can find people gullible enough. The same applies to all the other so-called major issues. We know quite well that corruption, whenever it reaches worth-while proportions, is protected by bipartisan counterinsurance. We can even understand how the issue of Communism-in-government can be raised, in spite of the fact that McCarthy has been unable to point out a single instance of a Communist-in-government at the present time. Everything can be made, as the saying goes, a political football in a Presidential year.

Everything but one thing, and that is Korea. No man, no matter how unparalleled his past achievements may have been, is entitled to play fast and loose with the hearts of American mothers. Everything can be turned into a football, but not that. There are times when, in hearing Senator Nixon talk about Korea or when we see the front page of a Scripps-Howard newspaper, we are overcome by a sense of national shame from which no one who is an American can be exempted. For sometimes, in the rude game of politics, even a good man can lose his head and play foul. But not that foul.

What Nixon Wouldn't Do

Implicit in the Republican pledge of more ethical housekeeping in Washington is the assumption that outside influences will be reduced in the event of a G.O.P. victory. Evidence is strong, however, that such influences are closer to many of the Republicans than they ever were to most Democrats. Senator John Bricker, running for re-election against former Price Administrator Michael DiSalle in Ohio, is a rather good case in point.

For the last four years Bricker's activities in the Senate can have done nothing to displease the real-estate and railroad lobbies. In 1948, the Pennsylvania Railroad dropped the Ohio law firm of Henderson, Burr & Randall and hired Senator Bricker's firm of Bricker, Marburger, Evatt & Barton. Government figures on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission reveal that the Bricker firm received the following fees from the Pennsylvania Railroad: $25,000 in 1948, $40,000 in 1949, $38,854 in 1950, and $35,000 in 1951. The Henderson firm never received more than $5,000 in any one year. When the St. Lawrence Seaway came up for a committee vote, Bricker split with Senator Taft and opposed the project, a development to which the railroads are also bitterly opposed.

There are obviously big matters pending in the transportation picture, particularly as they affect railroads. Recently a rather curious thing happened. Bricker is an influential man on the Senate Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee. Senators Bricker and O'Conor wrote Senate Report No. 1039, which dealt almost exclusively with railroads, although the committee had been studying the whole area of transportation for years. Chairman Edwin C. Johnson prefaced this report with the warning that the conclusions were "extremely controversial and . . . represent the views of authors and have neither been approved nor disapproved by the . . . Committee."

This report inspired a flurry of bills to ease restrictions on railroads. Senators Bricker, O'Conor, and Capehart introduced one bill providing that the railroads be permitted to fix their own rates while their cases were pending before the ICC.

BRICKER'S name still appears in the title of his law firm, and his office told us that he maintains a secretary there now. A prominent American might have been talking of such a situation when he said on September 23, 1952: ". . . as far as law practice is concerned, it seemed to me that the relationship between an attorney and the client was so personal that you couldn't possibly represent a man as an attorney and then have an unbiased view when he presented his case to you in the event that he had one before the Government."

That prominent American was Republican Vice-Presidential candidate Richard Nixon trying to vindicate his private fund by describing certain things that he would not do.

THE G.O.P. GOES SOUTH

Sad face, how deeply must the lines be worn
As now you see
Out of your dreams of union being born
This unity.
Avert your eyes from the obscene parade
Assembled in the South, your party file
Bearing aloft as banner of crusade
That wide and genial smile.
O Lincoln, how your living soul must turn
In anguish from this company of hates:
The bitter rich, the nigger-hating white
Confederates,
Closing their ranks against your shining hope
(While the shadow of rope
Coils from the nearest tree). Avert your eyes
From these new party champions who despise
Your charity.

—SEC

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CORRESPONDENCE

WHO IS THE ALIEN?

To the Editor: It is our feeling that Westbrook Pegler's recent remarks regarding our associations and intentions should be given some answer.

JEAN AND CHARLES E. ARGAST
Indianapolis

According to various Peglers, I have no right to concern myself with national affairs or—what they consider to be even worse—to run a political magazine. For I am not a native-born but a naturalized citizen, who came to this country twenty-one years ago as a political refugee from Fascist Italy.

Obviously, Pegler and his ilk think that citizenship papers don't mean much and that once an alien, always an alien. Indeed, where, in my misreading of American history, did I get the notion that a man who comes over here seeking freedom has the right and the duty to care for the free institutions of America?

*I am asked whether there is an answer to Pegler. My answer is a question: Who is the alien—Pegler or myself?—*M. A.]

A RATHER POINTED QUESTION

To the Editor: In your issue of September 0, you came out editorially in support of he Democratic candidate for President. I ave no particular quarrel with your choice f candidates. My amusement, or concern, rises from the fact that I happened on the ame evening after reading your endorsement to notice in a New York *Times* that in 948 Max Ascoli had contributed $500 to he Stevenson-for-Governor fund in Illinois. onsequently, I believe that your attraction o the Democratic candidate is not a recent ove affair but the prolongation of an old oneymoon. As it was, I had received the npression that your decision required much oul searching and analysis.

Since apparently your editorial was written before the recent financial exposés, I ish to ask you a rather pointed question: Would you have contributed $500 to a candidate if you had known that money might e used for paying Federal or state employees? That is, do you endorse the principle of outside pay to employees?

CRAIG SMYSER
Balboa Heights, Canal Zone

When Adlai Stevenson ran for Governor in 948, I thought he had taken the right decision at the wrong time; seldom if ever had met a man more qualified for public office, ut everybody in the know told me, "Stenson will be licked." I contributed to his ampaign fund to show my high appreciaon for Stevenson the man, regardless of party. Many Republicans, like John Hay Whitney of New York, felt the same way. In the Presidential election that year, I voted for Dewey. I guess I am a frustrated Republican; I would like nothing better than to go along with the liberal wing of the G.O.P., but I am seldom if ever given a chance.

About a year ago I reached the conclusion that Eisenhower was the answer to all my prayers. As soon as he came back, the Abilene speech made me rather uncomfortable, and practically all of his public utterances up to his nomination increased my discomfort. Even after his "Crusade" acceptance speech at the Republican Convention, even after Stevenson's nomination, I still was reluctant to give up my trust and my hope in the General. Then came Dirksen's participation in his high command, his endorsement of all Republican candidates, none excluded—and the rest. I could take no more.

As to the so-called Stevenson fund, no connection has been established between the Christmas compensation given by the Governor to some employees and the interests of people who, like myself, contributed to the Stevenson campaign fund. Yet I am one of those who got the most out of his contribution: First, the satisfaction of showing my solidarity with a friend engaged in what I thought was a forlorn fight; second, four years later, the publication of my picture in the New York Times.—M. A.]

LODGE AND KENNEDY

To the Editor: It seems to me that Ralph M. Blagden's article, "Cabot Lodge's Toughest Fight," in the September 30 issue, was a campaign piece for Lodge. In its total effect it painted Lodge's opponent, Congressman John F. Kennedy, as an isolationist taking his views from his multimillionaire father, Joseph P. Kennedy, and running for the Senate with the basic motive of "personal and family ambition." Such a picture of Jack Kennedy is grotesquely unfair, as I know from considerable experience with him in Congress.

Kennedy's "retreats" on international policy—as Mr. Blagden unjustly called Kennedy's two votes in 1951 for cuts in ECA to Europe and the Middle East—were conscientiously arrived at because his visits to Europe and the Middle East convinced him that there was bad planning and waste in the latter area and that our Allies in Europe were not pulling their oar with their full strength, and needed the shock of a cut in U.S. aid to make them do so.

Mr. Blagden does not mention at all some of Lodge's "retreats" on foreign policy—"retreats" representing positions the reverse of Kennedy's—e.g., (1) Lodge's announced opposition last year (he was absent from the Senate at the time) to the Kefauver-McMahon amendment to increase European military aid; (2) his vote for an amendment to the India Emergency Assistance bill which changed the gift of wheat into a loan, thus depriving our country's action of much of its moral effect in the Far East; (3) his repeated votes in 1948 and 1949 for amendments to the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act which experts in the trade field described as so crippling that they would almost vitiate the act.

Mr. Blagden, almost in so many words, stigmatizes Kennedy for the endorsement given him by Upton Close's anti-Semitic Constitution Party. He does not cite Kennedy's denunciation of that party and rejection of its endorsement.

In order to etch the picture of Kennedy as an isolationist more deeply, Mr. Blagden points to the support of Kennedy by some of the Taft leaders in Massachusetts. These Taft leaders announced for Kennedy not because they support what he stands for but because they hate Lodge so much.

GARDNER JACKSON
Boston

THE LAST WORD

To the Editor: As a lifelong opponent of the Senate filibuster and the House gag rule, it is only with reluctance that I prolong any debate. But I do feel it important for me to clarify my position, in view of William S. Fairfield's reply printed to my letter in your September 30 issue.

At the Democratic Convention, a very strong civil-rights plank was about to be adopted—with the Southerners going along—until a Negro member of the Drafting Committee, acting at the behest of certain standpat Northern figures, made a speech advocating compromise. I therefore called the adopted compromise a sellout. However, I pinned responsibility on the member mentioned above, and specifically stated that Senator Humphrey, also a member of the committee, could have done no more than he did.

Fairfield originally wrote that I accused Senator Humphrey of the sellout. When I wrote, and you printed, that this was not so, Mr. Fairfield then wrote that I had used the word "sellout" in his own presence, but did not say whether or not he thought I had applied it to Senator Humphrey. However, since the implication remains, I feel it necessary to clear the matter up for the record: I did use the word, but I did not apply it to Senator Humphrey. O.K.?

ADAM CLAYTON POWELL, JR.
Washington, D. C.

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The Reporter

A FORTNIGHTLY OF FACTS AND IDEAS

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in this issue . . .

Out of the haze of the Presidential campaign some foreign-policy facts have emerged quite clearly. One is that if we do not want the United States to have to make up the budget deficits for every free nation in the world indefinitely, some basic readjustments in the economic policies of the Atlantic allies are required. A second is the major candidates' contrasting approaches to our external affairs; the line of Adlai Stevenson clear and consistent; that of Dwight Eisenhower somewhat blurred and wavering, perhaps reflecting the extraordinary variety of positions taken at one time or another by Republican adviser John Foster Dulles. Third and most important, as the editorial points out, is the fact that the choice of the voters November 4 will be the American candidate for the leadership of the free world.

Richard H. Rovere, political writer, is best known for his pieces in the *New Yorker*. . . . **Kenneth W. Thompson** is Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. . . . **Klaus Knorr** is Professor of Economics at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton. . . . **S. L. A. Marshall** is military analyst for the Detroit *News*. . . . **Robert S. Elegant,** author of *China's Red Masters,* writes from East Asia. . . . **Alan Barth** is an editorial writer on the Washington *Post*. . . . **Mark A. Hennessey** is the pen name of a West Coast writer. . . . **Alfred Friendly** is on the staff of the Washington *Post*. . . . **Theodore Draper,** historian and journalist, recently returned from a trip to Spain for *The Reporter*. . . . **Karl Meyer** is doing graduate work in international affairs at Princeton. . . . **H. B. David** is a New York fiction writer. . . . Front cover by **Dong Kingman.**

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The Campaign Starts November 4

THE GREAT primary is coming to a close: The man who wins will be America's candidate for the leadership of the free world. In running against Joseph Stalin he will need to put a damper on factional strife at home and win the confidence of the allied as well as of the uncommitted peoples abroad.

In at least two major European countries—Germany and Italy—there are going to be crucial elections next year. In Asia our President will have to make the strongest possible case for America with the still-uncommitted nations like India and Indonesia.

FAR from being inscrutable, Stalin's plans are as plain in their substance as his prose is murky. He thinks that Soviet Russia is the new and bigger America destined to capture all the forces that capitalism and technology have released. Simultaneously, so he thinks, Communism will capture and pervert the naïve, irrepressible nationalism of the Asian and African peoples.

For the Communists, everything that is mass-produced and mass-consumed, from electricity to entertainment, can be made into irresistible weapons of mass conformity. Of course it always turns out that some Russian has preinvented whatever has been invented in America or in the West. Yet the Communists hang on our coattails, incessantly hating, studying, copying us. They find their consolation in the Marxist belief that we are paving the way for their ultimate victory, no matter what we think we are doing. They relish every evidence of growing mass conformity, every explosion of intolerance or of bigotry in our midst. They love to let the free world believe that they are catching up with us in steel production and that we are catching up with them in the leveling off of minds.

IN THIS campaign, that potential half of our nation, the G.O.P., has become strikingly similar to the picture of America that Communism cherishes. On the part of what is still called, for the lack of a better name, the Republican Party, there has been little if any scruple in using to the hilt all the up-to-date means of persuasion and of communication that unleash emotionalism in the masses. For years the American public has been conditioned to absorb moderate doses of opiates dished up by popular magazines, "B" movies, and soap operas. But there has never been anything here like the stultifying fare that the Republicans, day in and day out, have stuffed down the throats of the American people via press, radio, and television. A half-mythical Wall Street may have had something to do with this, but certainly another New York thoroughfare—Madison Avenue—has risen to a position of extraordinary prominence. The achievements have been, according to the parlance of the advertising trade, "terrific": Just look how that new brand name, Nixon, has swept the country!

Even our best friends abroad have often expressed concern over what they call the unpredictability of America's policy. But should the Republicans prevail, no one here or abroad can have the foggiest notion of what our country's course may become, for the Republican candidate himself has voiced all possible policies at various times in various localities. He seems to have espoused the principle that the end justifies the means—a principle that the Communists don't find hard to understand. Unfortunately, the means he uses are not just election gimmicks but men who would bedevil his Administration just as they have bedeviled his campaign.

ON the other side, Adlai Stevenson, while tirelessly talking to American citizens about American interests, has never lost sight of the fact that the constituency of an American President in our days extends far beyond the territorial limits of the American nation. Stevenson has set himself a standard of leadership of such a nature that he will have no difficulty in moving on, after having won the election, to the next stage of the campaign. The peoples of the world desperately need a man who talks sense to them and tells them the truth, the truth about the new world that is aborning—if only they do their part. In running as the candidate of the free world, Stevenson will be guided by the same principles he has followed at home, while asking for the confidence of his own people.

Abroad, where we have to face Stalin's competition, there is no such thing as the monopoly market that Madison Avenue enjoys over here. No saturation press-radio-television offensive can be set up to gain what Republican strategists still call "the battle for the minds of men."

Our next President will live up to his mandate only if he wins the leadership of the democracies' coalition. Stevenson can win this leadership. Eisenhower cannot.

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When Is Dulles Dulles?

RICHARD H. ROVERE

THE LATE Wendell Willkie, ruefully eying the shards of his political career in the closing months of his life, often said that he owed his misfortunes to a dead diplomat named John W. Foster. Foster served eight months as Benjamin Harrison's Secretary of State, a stopgap replacement for James G. Blaine, who had resigned to have a final whack at the Presidency.

It was Willkie's half-facetious contention that if Foster had never attained this brief eminence, his grandson John Foster Dulles would not have been inflamed with the desire to fill the office himself, in which event he would not have dedicated himself to the political advancement of Thomas E. Dewey. It amused and perhaps consoled Willkie to speak of his antagonist as a mere invention of Dulles's, as the political arm, so to speak, of the prominent law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell, of which Dulles was the head until 1949.

Defective on the face of it, Willkie's theory nevertheless throws a certain light on Dulles's career. Dulles himself has often borne witness to the force of the ancestral pull. He has said, for example, that after the Bible and Shakespeare, his grandfather's *Diplomatic Memoirs,* in two volumes, is the work to which he most often returns. Since the Bible and Shakespeare invariably have a kind of honorific status in inventories of this sort, this is a remarkable tribute.

Dulles's favorite work of graphic art is a Japanese chromo in which Grandfather Foster is shown declaiming in the presence of ten attentive, admiring Orientals, participants in the Shimonoseki Peace Conference of 1895. The then ex-Secretary had been hired by the Chinese, who had been badly thrashed by Japan in a war on Korea's dark and bloody ground, to get them the best deal possible. "He was called," Dulles has explained, "not just because of his individual qualities but because he partook of the great quality which possessed our nation at the time." At Shimonoseki, the Chinese gave up Formosa and their hegemony in Korea.



This was not Foster's only venture into Pacific diplomacy. As Harrison's deputy, he had drafted a treaty of annexation with Hawaii, which would probably have been ratified if the Democrats hadn't got back in office and thrown it out. In 1907, Foster was once more retained by the Chinese, this time to lead their delegation to the Second Hague Conference; his grandson, John Foster Dulles, then nineteen and a Princeton sophomore, served as the delegation's secretary. Later, in the Wilson Administration, Dulles was recommended for a series of diplomatic odd jobs by Secretary of State Robert Lansing, with whom he had an indirect family connection by marriage.

When John Foster Dulles talks of this rich background in affairs of state, he somehow conveys the feeling that history itself would be displeased by the Republic's failure to take advantage of it. "Dulles was trained for diplomacy as Nijinsky was for the ballet," one biographer has written. After an interview in 1944, Forrest Davis made a remarkably bold argument in Dulles's behalf. "Seldom," he wrote, "has an American been so conditioned, schooled, and groomed for public service. In fact, we must go back to the early Adamses for a true precedent." Clearly no precedent could be found in such upstart houses as those of Roosevelt, Taft, La Follette, or MacArthur.

It was, in any case, a fond destiny, and one mindful of tradition and of legitimate tribal pride, that so arranged events as to make it possible for Dulles to be the architect of a great peace in the Pacific last year. For Fosters and for Dulleses, the Japanese treaty must have been an observance, a fulfillment. For the architect himself, it was doubtless a great stone in the edifice, conceivably its crown. Still, the edifice is

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incomplete—he has not yet become Secretary of State.

Dulles's hopes have risen quadrennially since 1940 and have quadrennially been dashed. They are at present, perhaps, not quite so high or strong as they were in the Dewey years, for his claims on an Eisenhower Administration would not be so powerful as his claims on a Dewey Administration would have been. Dulles was not Dewey's inventor, as Willkie's wayward fancy had it, but he was for many years Dewey's most influential friend, his leading promoter, his preceptor and patient guide to the world that lay beyond the numbers rackets and the Court of General Sessions. He would for a certainty have been Dewey's Secretary of State. Well before Dulles's recent triumphs, Dewey was settled in the opinion that Dulles was "the world's greatest statesman."

IT HAS NOT been established that Eisenhower sees it in exactly that way, but there is a widespread feeling that Dulles is the front runner at the moment. Still honored by Dewey and by the other Eastern Republicans with whom he is generally identified, he is, thanks to his neutrality before and during the Convention and to his authorship of the foreign-policy section of the 1952 Republican platform, one of the few members of the Eastern group whose presence in the Cabinet would give no offense—or very little—to Senator Taft. This favorable circumstance was not altogether uncontrived. Whereas, in serving Dewey, Dulles regularly declined invitations to assist with the party's platform—feeling, as he told one reporter, that participation might limit his and Dewey's subsequent freedom of choice—he determined in 1952 to put aside such narrow concerns and to serve the party by composing a statement of principles acceptable to both of its leading factions.

Dulles accordingly resigned from government service on March 25, saying, "I look forward to . . . expressing my views about foreign policy under conditions which will not risk embarrassment . . . to any Presidential candidate." Shortly thereafter he was expressing views that turned out to be not only his own but Taft's and Eisenhower's too, and it was with the explicit approval of both that he undertook his work on the platform.

By his success he achieved a unique standing. Already a prophet of bipartisanship, he became his party's leading agent of bifactionalism. It is not easy to see how Eisenhower could pass him up.

DULLES would bring to the Secretaryship a good deal more than an imposing pedigree. He is a shrewd and intelligent man; he has acquired over the years a considerable knowledge of the

world; he is unquestionably a skilled diplomatic technician. One can admire the Japanese treaty as a piece of creative statesmanship, unprecedented in magnanimity and in breadth of vision, or one can deplore it as a thing whose poor substance is concealed in a resplendent form, but the fact remains that its negotiation by Dulles was something of a *coup de maître*. In the United Nations and as an ambassador-at-large, he has been an adroit, patient, and widely respected strategist, and often an eloquent spokesman of American interest. He knows at first hand the workings of the State Department and the moods of the United States Senate. In terms of experience, his qualifications are formidable.

Up to now, however, Dulles has been, in the official phases of his career only an instrument of policy. How he would perform as a maker of policy is a question on which the record is at once baffling and disquieting. Although he has been articulate, almost at times to the point of garrulity, in rendering judgments on matters of foreign policy, it is exceedingly difficult to make out the basic pattern of his thought, or even to determine whether it has any pattern.

The All-Embracing View

Over the years Dulles has embraced nearly every view of the world and of America's relation to it available to rational men in his time. In his youth, he has said, he was fired by the Wilsonian dream, which he served as a young lawyer at the Paris conferences. At some point or other between wars, it lost its hold upon him. In the late 1930's and early 1940's, he leaned strongly toward isolationism. "Only

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hysteria," he declared in 1939, "entertains the idea that Germany, Italy, or Japan contemplates war against us." And: "I see no justification for our participation in the senseless cyclical struggle which, under our present world system, always goes on between static and dynamic forces."

The "dynamic" forces were, in context, the totalitarian states, the "static" ones their antagonists. Dulles's critics have suggested the possibility that this view was a particularly convenient one for the head of a law firm dealing profitably (Dulles was often said to be the world's most highly paid lawyer) with a number of dynamic cartels. If the view was convenient in this respect, there is no evidence that this was why Dulles adopted it. The most plausible, as well as the most honorable, interpretation is that disillusionment with Versailles led him, on the one hand, to exaggerate the injustices done Germany and, on the other, to despair of national states being able to create an order based on peace and justice. It was a common enough attitude and morally not indefensible.

The attitude lasted only briefly, though. When the war was on, when he and his protégé Dewey were hopeful of becoming war leaders, he was once more a Wilsonian, and John Chamberlain was able to come away from a talk with Dulles and report that his views were "broadly those of Cordell Hull. Both the present and the hypothetical future Secretary of State think in terms of a continuing understanding between the United Kingdom, the U.S., Russia, and China. And both hope to see the world covered eventually by a peace system based on a new league assembly, a world court, and a system of commonly accepted international law."

DULLES's recent books, articles, and speeches fail to dispel the paradoxes that seem embedded in his thought. On the contrary, they add new ones. A note he recurrently strikes is that he is seeking "to find ways whereby the moral force of Christendom [can] make itself felt in the conduct of nations." He says he has held this idea for fifteen years. "In 1937," he has written, "I attended the Oxford Conference on Church and State. That conference persuaded me that there was no way to solve the great perplexing international problems except by bringing to bear upon them the force of Christianity."

He then and there, at Oxford, saw that "the best thing I could do with the rest of my life" was to translate the persuasion into policy. This charismatic approach extended through both his period of isolationism and his period of regenerate Wilsonianism, one of which must have been better informed by apostolic values than the other, and, indeed, endures today, when the student of Dulles's career is confounded by the statesman's two distinct and plainly incompatible views of our present situation.

Changing Times, Changing Dulles

There are times when Dulles's sanguineness seems to know no bounds and times when his view is crabbed and denying. "We stand at a threshold beyond which lies a vista of opportunities that are immense and glorious," he said in May of last year. "The last five years have been years of achievement, and . . . our people have already surmounted a great peril."

In August of this year, however, he said that he, General Eisenhower, and Senator Nixon were in agreement that American foreign policy had "put this nation in the greatest peril it has ever been in [in] the entire course of our national history."

Retroactive Impeachments

To be sure, the situation could have changed for the worse in the meantime; Dulles's impeachments, however, are as a rule retroactive, and it is clear from his contribution to the Republican platform that the five years of achievement, in which, as he saw it, peril had been surmounted, were concurrent with the period of unparalleled danger. "The present Administration," Dulles wrote in the platform, "in seven years has squandered the unprecedented power and prestige which were ours at the close of World War II." On account of this profligacy, "Russia . . . proceeds confidently with its plan for world conquest. We charge that the leaders of the Administration now in power have lost the peace so dearly earned by World War II."

When he served the Administration, Dulles made directly contrary assessments. In 1949 he said: "Soviet Communist tactics cannot prevail against such curative and creative programs as we have been evolving over the past two years." And two years after that: "The struggle for peace, freedom, and liberation is being greatly aided by the effort the United States is now making. . . . [Today] the free world, with the United States in the lead, is creating a force-in-being sufficient to hearten those who love freedom."

NO DOUBT astutely, the Republican platform takes advantage of public anxiety and discouragement over the war in Korea. It is curious, though, that Dulles, of all men, should so willingly have undertaken to heighten these moods. No one in public life was more inspirited than Dulles by our Korean intervention. Just as the first American troops were going ashore at Pusan, he made a Fourth of July speech at the base of the Washington Monument. "What we are doing today," he said, "is in keeping with the tradition of our past. We can say with pride that our spirit today is the spirit of '76 and that our living today is faithful to the principles on which our nation was founded."

In Tokyo when the fighting broke out and Dulles was just back from a tour of Korea, he had not apprised his

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government of the "unfavorable conditions" for which he later blamed the Administration. He cabled the State Department: IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE SOUTH KOREANS MAY THEMSELVES CONTAIN AND REPULSE THE ATTACK, AND IF SO, THIS IS THE BEST WAY. IF, HOWEVER, IT APPEARS THAT THEY CANNOT DO SO, THEN WE BELIEVE UNITED STATES FORCE SHOULD BE USED. A year and even two years later, Dulles's enthusiasm was still soaring. On June 30 of last year, *Time* quoted him as saying that "President Truman, with bipartisan support, acted promptly and vigorously" in response to the appeal from the Republic of Korea. And on May 19 of this year, he himself wrote in *Life:* "President Truman's decision that the United States should go to the defense of the Korean Republic was courageous, righteous, and in the national interest."

Korea was not an occasion for ruffles or bugle notes in the Republican platform. "We charge," it says, "that [the Administration] plunged us into war in Korea without the consent of our citizens through their authorized representatives in Congress. . . . [It] committed this nation to fight back under the most unfavorable conditions."

The life of a platform writer is hard and onerous. He is almost by definition a dealer in grotesqueries. To seek formulations, however, in which the factions of a great party can submerge or bypass their differences is not necessarily a dishonorable job, and a man should be allowed something in the way of a moral discount when he is clearly speaking for others rather than for himself.

Dulles has on occasion applied for such a discount. In Chicago, during the Convention, he was asked by a reporter, who happened to be the author of this article, how he could condemn the Administration for not defending the Baltic republics, since they had been seized two years before we entered the war and at a time, furthermore, when he was urging us to stay out of the "senseless cyclical struggle" to maintain national sovereignties. Dulles replied that as an individual he could not do so, but that as a platform writer he was merely stating the Republican case against the Democratic Party, which was committed by the Atlantic Charter to the principle of liberation. This was at least a point of view on the question—no one, after all, is shocked to learn that an advertising writer doesn't smoke the brand of cigarettes or wash with the kind of soap he praises—but the difficulty in Dulles's case is that even the closest observer can never be sure of when the man really is speaking for himself.

Dulleses Unite!

It would be a fairly simple matter if we could appeal from Dulles the platform writer to Dulles the practicing statesman, but the statesman will not allow us to do this. Last summer, when Senator Paul Douglas pointed out that in view of the fact that in 1949 Dulles had secured the passage in the U.N. General Assembly of a resolution for the withdrawal of troops from Korea, there was a certain incongruity in his accusing the government of dereliction of duty in complying with the resolution, Dulles blandly replied that in sponsoring the resolution, he had merely acted as an agent of his government. Citing the United Nations Participation Act, which says in substance that our U.N. representatives must take orders from the President whether they like them or not, he insisted that he could not be held accountable for the terms of the resolution or for the eloquent arguments he made in its favor.

He was indeed right about the Participation Act. But in bringing it up, he raised a serious question: When is Dulles Dulles? He will not be judged by the Republican platform; in writing it, he insists, he was setting down a party's bill of particulars, not the verdict of an individual conscience. He will not be judged, except on some sort of selective basis, by his work in the General Assembly, where he was dutifully representing an Administration whose foreign policy he privately felt—or did he?—was putting this nation "in the greatest peril . . . in the entire course of our national history."

By the agent theory, almost every Dulles we have ever known can be made to vanish from sight and judgment. The Dulles of the Japanese treaty was an agent, and so was the Dulles of the Big Four meetings, and so was the bipartisan Dulles in the State Department, and so was the Dulles who was a spokesman for Governor Dewey, and so was the Dulles who is now referred to in the press as a spokesman on foreign-policy matters for General Eisenhower.

SOMEWHERE among all these Dulleses is a private individual, a conscience. The occasional glimpses we get of it are not reassuring. It appears to be characterized mainly by a thin and achromatic spirituality. Looking every inch the worldling, he nevertheless hankers after what he calls "the spiritual society." In his books, where he may be presumed to be speaking for himself, he is constantly belaboring us for false values. Americans of recent times, the former head of Sullivan & Cromwell wrote two years ago in *War or Peace,* seem "to be less concerned with conducting a great experiment for the benefit of mankind and to be more concerned with piling up for ourselves material advantages." (The Republican platform promises to "measure our foreign commitments so that they can be borne without endangering the . . . sound finances of the United States.") Sometimes he is given to saying that none of our problems are essentially political or economic: "The trouble is not material . . . What we lack is a righteous and dynamic faith. . . . There is confusion in men's minds and a corrosion in their souls."

Dulles has not, however, gone much beyond advising us of our shortcomings, and we cannot know much of his own righteous and dynamic faith until he tells us which of the Dulleses embodies it.

In any case, he very much wants to be Secretary of State.

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The Governor, the General, And the Rest of the World

KENNETH W. THOMPSON

GONE are the days when it appeared that Governor Stevenson and General Eisenhower, as convinced internationalists, shared a solid common ground in matters of foreign policy. The very first weeks of the campaign proved the contrary beyond all doubt.

The General spoke sympathetically of a campaign to liberate the enslaved countries of eastern Europe—a concept that evoked fear in the hearts of many west Europeans. On negotiating with the Russians, Eisenhower declared that he placed little hope in such undertakings. Finally, he has shown little interest in, or understanding of, the revolt of the nonwhite people throughout the world.

On these three points Governor Stevenson has taken opposing stands. The Governor of Illinois has urged that we regard with some caution the "mischievous doctrine" of liberation, that we strive to negotiate with the Russians, and that we tailor our policies and propaganda to appeal more strongly to the more than two-thirds of the world's people who are, in his words, "struggling to shake off the shackles of white colonialism."

Although the Governor and the General are internationalists, these differences are not mere accidents. They reflect a radical difference in precision of mind and of information. The General's approach, one feels, is being worked out for the first time under the pressure of the campaign; the Governor's has been a matter of public record for some years past. Practically all of the quoted statements in this article are taken from Stevenson's pre-nomination speeches.

Both candidates appear to believe that the United States can no longer live alone and like it. But many supporters of General Eisenhower prefer the Taft-Hoover policy to that of their candidate, while Governor Stevenson has been unsparing in his criticism of all isolationists: "Haven't they heard about Pearl Harbor or the atom bomb? Was the last war all in vain? Haven't they heard that we are not self-sufficient?" Stevenson's opposition to isolationism is an informed one. He also remarked: ". . . the isolationist argument will have at least nine lives, for the very human reason that it pleases the average man because it spares him any immediate inconvenience or sacrifice, and it flatters his sense of power to feel that Americans can live alone and like it."

Cutting the Suit to Fit the Cloth

Thinking on American foreign policy has not stood still. Through modern technology the world has become interdependent; as Woodrow Wilson bravely taught, we have a stake in what happens anywhere in the world. No nation has unlimited resources, and any state must bring its commitments and power into balance. Every nation has, or discovers, a hierarchy of objectives, some of which it must follow at any cost, others that are less vital. Governor Stevenson stands with Prime Minister Churchill as one of the few western statesmen who know that international responsibilities must reflect enlightened national interest. On April 22, 1952, he declared: "No greater difficulty confronts us than the wise and thrifty allocation of our limited resources and capabilities in relation to all the demands made upon us."

Other nations, including our allies, act on the same basis, and the success of American foreign policy largely depends on how well we are able to recognize these demands and interests and to reconcile them with our own. As Stevenson has put it: "The United States will find support among peoples in the free states to the degree that they believe that we do not simply consult our own interests but give consideration to their interests as well—that we in truth have a 'decent respect for the opinions of mankind.' Other nations have a reciprocal obligation to give weight to our interests too. There is no doubt that our power gives us an advantage in this process. But neither is there room to doubt that if we wish allies who will go forward with us with courage and fortitude into the risks of the future, they must be willing and confident allies."

The World Crisis

In the past year and a half we have found how immensely important a clear sense of the real issues in the cold war can be. Both the Administration and General Eisenhower have claimed that the present conflict is a simple struggle between Communism and democracy. Yet the United States has established friendly relations with a Communist régime in Yugoslavia. How can we justify this? Neither General Eisenhower nor the Administra-

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tion has been very successful in explaining this apparent inconsistency. The truth is that our crisis is a conflict between Communism and democracy only in the long run. In the short run we face the same threat of reactionary Russian imperialism that for centuries endangered the interests of Britain and France. In Governor Stevenson's words:

"Capitalizing the ancient racial xenophobia and the messianic zeal to missionize the world of the Russian people, the leaders of the new Russia, armed with force and the old weapon of fomented revolution, use the seductive new weapon of Communism to soften their victims. But whatever the trappings, the methods, the weapons, the objective is domination—imperialism. I often think it would be both more accurate and more effective if we talked less of Communism with all its appeal for ignorant, miserable peoples and more of imperialism which threatens the freedom and independence of everyone and has no appeal."

How can we best thwart Russian imperialism? According to Governor Stevenson: ". . . only by once again redressing the balance of power in the world and confronting the Russians with a preponderance of force . . ." That will require allies like Yugoslavia, but in this endeavor we must never confuse means and ends. Stevenson has warned: "The Russians know the value of even reluctant allies in this final struggle for power. Do we? Or are we going to risk the slow strangulation that comes from whittling away the friendly world?" Since our own power is not unlimited, we must bind strong and reliable allies to us with iron bands of moral and political accord.

Beyond imperialism, the nature of the struggle is, of course, the world-wide rivalry of democracy and Communism. This is a struggle for the minds and moral commitments of people all over the world, and it promises to continue well beyond our generation. For Governor Stevenson:

"The preservation of the free world hangs upon our ability to win the allegiance of those millions and millions of people throughout the world who have not yet made their choice between our democratic system, on the one hand, and the promises which Communism offers, on the other. That choice will be mainly shaped by our own performance. It will turn upon such things as our ability to avoid the disruptions of depression, to guarantee equality of opportunity, to narrow the gulfs separating economic status, to preserve freedom of thought and action, to make democracy accord in practice with its premises and professions of faith."

In the short run Communism enjoys important advantages:

". . . Communism resolves no anxieties. It multiplies them. It organizes terror. It is without spiritual content or comfort. It provides no basic security. In the long run it cannot cure the disease of this anxious age. But its short-term methods are grimly effective. We can't sit still and wait for the fever to run its course. Without combative faith in our spiritual heritage, we won't long hold out against the subtleties of selfishness and fear. If western civilization is to save its body, it must save its soul too. It must awaken again the emotionalism, the confidence, the defiant faith of a resolute breed of men to whom liberty and justice mean something positive every day—not just when war has reduced us to the stark issue of self-preservation.

"It's easy to care mightily then; it's hard now. It's easier to fight for principles than to live up to them. But now is the time that a passionate belief counts if we are to avoid the greater menace of cowardly surrender to our own doubts and fears."

Communism can be defeated only where the West resolves to export not only its ideals but the techniques and knowledge that can feed hungry people.

"There was a day," according to the Democratic candidate, "when we Americans believed that it was only necessary for the rest of the world to know about democratic freedom and then they would desperately want it. We used to take it pretty much for granted that the oppressed and wretched masses of Asia, or even the primitive natives of Africa, would be yearning for the blessings of freedom and democracy. Forgetting our own stormy history and bitter struggles, in our blind faith and sometimes naïve hope, we failed to recognize that words and platitudes, dreams and ideals, were not sufficient to win the interest of the hungry, oppressed and ignorant. We exported our speeches and our finished goods, but seldom offered a way for all to share in these goods or the tangible hope which would give concrete meaning to our ideas and free institutions.

"But of late we have been awakening to the fact that people who have been hungry or oppressed are attracted by adroit, emphatic demagogues who offer them a blueprint of a new world without hunger and oppression. True, we know these blueprints don't disclose the price in terms of human rights and freedoms, but to the native of Burma or the coolie of China who has never enjoyed and seldom even heard of these privileges of democratic life they have scarcely any meaning.

"Almost too late we have learned that hope to many does not precede but follows tangible economic and social advance. So at last we are rapidly learning the facts of life and making the first beginnings of a realistic attack on the central problem of our time, which is victory in the war of ideas and peace. Now, belatedly, we are starting to export our most marketable and precious product, the 'know-how' which has made this country the envy of the world and the greatest social and political force since the fall of Rome."

Europe and Asia

General Eisenhower and Governor Stevenson seem to agree on the whole with the policy pursued by the Truman Administration in western Europe. The General, it should be remembered, was engaged in administering a vital part of it. There are two

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points, however, that Stevenson has recognized that neither the President nor the General has stressed. The first is that there can be no Maginot Line in Europe. Not the military forces which are stationed at the Rhine but the industrial and military potential of the United States and its atomic superiority have been the greatest deterrents to Russian imperialism.

In Stevenson's outlook it is the United States that is "the one great obstacle to a world safe [for] Communism." And: "The power, for good or for evil, of the political organization which goes by the name of the United States of America is virtually beyond measurement. The decisions which it makes, the uses to which it devotes its immense resources, the leadership which it provides on moral as well as material questions, all appear likely to determine the fate of the modern world."

Secondly, Stevenson recognizes that the situation of Europe is not permanently and inflexibly fixed. Many things remain open for negotiation, including the place of Germany. In the long run, perhaps, even eastern Europe might once more rejoin its ancient partners in the West. Stevenson would not be dogmatic or doctrinaire but would keep matters open.

IT IS in Asia that the greatest differences arise between Stevenson and Eisenhower. It is a mark of the conservative mind that it often only partly understands profound social and political change. Today much of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa is racked by social convulsions born of envy, hatred, and resentment lodged in the breasts of nonwhites against the white man.

Patience, Insight, Restraint

At the low point of our fortunes in Korea, Stevenson said: "Pray heaven we can remember amid the discord and chagrin of defeat that military force alone cannot win the day for us in Asia. Our moral authority there is low because we are white and Asia is colored. Desperately poor, struggling to shake off the shackles of white colonialism, Asia is just now passing through the era of revolution, independence, and self-determination that swept the western world long ago. It will take great patience, great insight, great restraint for us who see the whole world in our own image and likeness to win confidence and faith in the great uncommitted areas of Asia. It can't be done with the white man's sword. But it can be done; they can be convinced that Communist imperialism is not liberation but a more deadly enemy of normal aspirations for freedom and social justice than colonialism."

The United Nations

The Governor, the General, and the President have all said that they believe in the United Nations. Not all of the General's followers agree with their candidate; some have charged that the United Nations is un-American and that it squanders our blood and treas-

ure. General Eisenhower has declared, however, that although the United Nations has not been successful in many of its undertakings, it should be preserved in the hope it may develop in the future.

Governor Stevenson, who played a not unimportant role in shaping the United Nations, considers it to be, along with our regional-security system, the "best and only hope for collective security and peace in the world." Yet his views fall somewhere between those who say that the United Nations is nothing and those who say that it must be everything. What troubles him most is that "When things go right we gush paeans of praise for the United Nations; when they go wrong we damn it and even propose to forsake the good because it is not the perfect."

In the same speech as Governor, Stevenson exclaimed: "In fatuous haste to be shut of war, worry, and expense we obliterate our power and leave it to the United Nations to keep a peace that never existed." On February 26, 1951, Governor Stevenson enjoined an assembly of devoted supporters of the United Nations to remember this: ". . . the U.N. is not a full-blown collective security system and it is dangerous to think of it and operate within it as if it were. It's a council table, not a police force." The United Nations is one of the few remaining places where we have maintained "at least formal contact between the two worlds." This is vitally important, since "when we cease to talk, we will probably start to fight . . ."

Stevenson also sees the United Nations as a forum in which the United States can obtain support for its policies by the rest of the world.

ABOVE ALL, Stevenson favors a realistic approach. "The idealistic-moralistic approach to the U.N. has been useful in overcoming public inertia and in launching the organization," he has said, "but it is now high time the public matured its thinking about the U.N. . . . We should look at the U.N., as we look at other political instruments, and see what it is *not,* disabuse ourselves of any illusions and recognize how useful it has been, is and can still be."

Stevenson looks upon the United Nations as only part of a world-wide network of collective and regional security. Some supporters of the United Nations have considered it on an either-or basis, either the United Nations or regional alliances. The Governor thinks that it would be wiser to emphasize both the United Nations and the other security arrangements such as NATO. He would relate the United Nations "as a world-wide agency to other parts of the collective security system."

ESSENTIALLY, the United Nations is for Adlai Stevenson "a political framework through which a broad coalition of the free world operates. . . . It is vital to our security to have this political framework as the maintenance and development of the coalition of the free world is our chief political task today. And if it did not exist it would have to be created even today."

Stevenson's program for peace is not

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an election stunt, for his views were outlined in greater detail before the campaign was launched.

From one viewpoint his outlook is identical with the General's, for both have said there can be no substitute for strength—both national and collective, military and spiritual—if we are to survive. Yet the Governor's views, which are political as well as military, have caused him to go one step further.

A QUESTION that concerns Stevenson is "What happens after we achieve strength?" Throughout most of the recent history of Europe, it was said that European diplomats carried two arrows in their quivers. One was marked STRENGTH, the other NEGOTIATION. Even today the two are inseparable, for negotiation without strength produces appeasement, while strength without diplomacy creates an unending armament race from which war is the only release.

"We must try to put an end to the arms race before it puts an end to us," he has urged. "We must seek a way through which the United States can halt Communist imperialism without appeasement and the arms race without war." Before long America's growing strength may make "serious negotiation with the Soviet Union" a reality. Before that day has arrived and then passed tragically beyond our reach, we must "devise the means for making coexistence with a ruthless, inscrutable tyranny tolerable." Moreover, "a lot more thinking should be done about what is required beyond the immediate necessity of strength." There are certain areas in which even East and West have mutual interests. For one, "an everlasting arms race is folly for them as it is for us."

Winston Churchill and others have urged time and again that we make one last supreme effort to arrive at a settlement with the Soviet Union. Stevenson, however, in a private letter has written: "I think we have to approach the problem on a more patient and continuous basis and that . . . our problem is to conduct a wise diplomacy that takes advantage of any openings but remains undiscouraged. Perhaps the phrase 'diplomacy from strength' might be useful in characterizing my position."

No fair-minded observer, turning from the consistent precision of the Governor's informed judgment and policies, can miss the contrast with the General's vague rhetoric and vaporous generalizations. On September 22 in Cincinnati, General Eisenhower revealed that "peace is the reward reserved for those who, guided by confidence in themselves and faith in God, will develop their utmost in material and moral strength and devote that strength to that righteous cause of peace." In his October 5 speech at Billings, Montana, touching once again on foreign policy, he reported that "our prestige abroad, the picture of a united America ready to stand behind principles of trust and integrity, and to stand firmly for its just rights in the world, will lead the other nations that are still struggling desperately to stay free of Communist domination, will lead them to join with us under a truly mighty protective umbrella that will make us all safe."

Just how this momentous umbrella might be raised and what would take place beneath it Eisenhower characteristically left unsaid.

Economics for the Atlantic Allies: How to Build the Road Ahead

KLAUS KNORR

THE alliance of free western nations cannot be on a secure footing until the major partners find a way of keeping their foreign trade and payments books balanced. Britain, the sterling area, and the countries of western Europe are still unable to do this. To be sure, the deficits—and especially the dollar deficits, which were running so high during the second half of 1951—have been cut. They have been cut, however, chiefly by making further reductions in badly needed imports. The deficit nations, whose payments to other countries exceed their receipts from those with surpluses, are dangerously lowering their gold and dollar reserves. This is the third such severe payments crisis since the war ended, and it has made western economic planners think in bolder terms about the necessity of a completely new structure of west European economic cooperation.

The deficit countries are coming to realize that past financial policies, including American emergency aid, can keep the payments structure from collapse, but that the foundations of the system cannot be strengthened without large-scale reconstruction. In many ways this west European mood has its counterpart in Washington. Responsible officials there are not unduly gloomy, because they see an opportunity for advocating and creating a stronger apparatus than has been hitherto possible.

WASHINGTON officials are very much aware that foreign economic assistance of the old type, and certainly at the rate of previous years, is becoming less and less palatable to Congress. More than that, they feel that continuation of such assistance hinders rather than helps the building of solid foundations for the economic and financial strength of the West. For one thing, the original objective of the ECA type of loan has already been achieved. West-

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ern European production is above its prewar levels. To continue such aid would impede necessary growth and discourage more effective action.

Perhaps most undesirable is the persisting atmosphere of a kind of doctor-patient or donor-supplicant relationship. The first makes for an unhealthy financial hypochondria and the second for the undesirable political and moral climate of a seeming philanthropy. Given the proper economic state of mind, the patient need not be as sick as he is now considered to be, nor, in fact, does he still want to be treated as a patient at all. He need not be as poor as he is considered either, nor does he wish to be treated as a pauper.

WESTERN Europe could, of course, be left to itself. That would be one way of solving the dollar problem—the way of contraction: a decrease in consumption, investment, defense; a sharp fall in American exports; the end of all hopes for a more liberal trading system; and, inevitably, a period of perilous economic and political instability. It would be equally dangerous if, despairing of a more constructive solution, western Europe took the initiative in cutting itself loose from the onerous burden of American leadership. In Britain, some Tories as well as influential Bevanites advocate a heavy cut in defense expenditures, commercial retreat to the protected confines of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and radical discrimination against American exports. Such action would amount to washing one's hands only to dirty one's face, and even the petulant and irascible do not really want that. On the contrary, the feeling in official Washington now is for more *mutual* responsibility, not less—a responsibility more painstaking and comprehensive



in concept and solider in organization. It is felt that the United States must match constructive European efforts by assuming duties more complex and perhaps more difficult than the administration of financial blood transfusions. To the extent that accepting American aid was an easy way out of the dilemma for Europe, giving such aid was also an easy way out for the United States.

Targets and Weapons

Defining the over-all objective is simple enough: to reduce balance-of-payments fluctuations to moderate proportions. Where the new thinking differs from the old, however, is in a conviction that western European economic stability cannot be achieved through isolated actions, however large and impressive. What is needed, rather, is a program with several related objectives, in the administering of which there is constant, flexible, closely watched co-ordination between the parts. The west European countries must attain levels of investment high enough to ensure economic progress, levels of defense high enough to add to their military security, and levels of consumption commensurate with the recognized benefits of the democratic system.

Moreover, it is imperative that there be a progressive liberalization of trading and payments conditions in the west European countries and a sharp reduction of trade barriers in the United States. Without such assurance, it is difficult to employ productive resources efficiently on either side of the Atlantic and thus permit maximum levels of consumption, investment, and defense.

These are, or ought to be, the objectives. Their multiplicity is obvious enough. Obvious, too, are the difficulties which must inevitably accompany their achievement, for their aims cut across various strong interests, concepts, thought patterns, and regional prejudices. Undoubtedly they stand little chance of adoption unless it is made clear that the other choices for western Europe are political and economic chaos and disintegration.

What are the proper instruments for action? If the temptation to tinker with symptoms must be overcome, it is equally necessary to resist those who recommend attacking the "basic causes" of the trouble, especially when



those "causes" do not lend themselves readily to attack. The real necessity is to identify and concentrate on the strategic variables which can be most effectively handled.

There are five such variables that can be acted upon, and there are five corresponding policies that can contribute to the desired result.

First, it is important that all countries involved establish safeguards for monetary stability, for avoiding pronounced inflation and deflation. The governments of countries with persistent export surpluses, especially the United States, should continue to be alert against lapses from reasonably full employment. Even a slight business recession in the United States, such as the one in 1949, causes a large drop in American imports, which means a drop in dollar disbursements to the outside world. As for the deficit countries of Europe, they can keep close watch on the totals of their consumption, investment, and defense expenditures. They should not exceed what they can afford on the basis of their own production and borrowing from abroad. They would thus prevent inflationary pressures which increase the demand for both imports and exportable goods, and thus tend to upset the balance of their external payments. To advocate this as a generality may seem, of course, like being against sin. Yet several European countries have only recently showed signs of having learned this lesson. Their governments have taken the trouble, for the first time since the war, to explain to their people, resolutely, that continuous external deficits are not simply statistical hocus-pocus but are matters of vital concern to the well-being of everyone.

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Second, the surplus countries ought to expand the export of capital for long-term investment. The deficit countries, for their part, should welcome such loans, provided they are used strictly in productive investment —regardless of whether the capital comes from private or public funds. In this respect the United States might well consider the desirability of advocating a more liberal lending policy by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and of participating in such multinational development projects as Britain's Colombo Plan for Asia. Prospective borrowing countries, on the other hand, should consider giving dependable guarantees for the fair treatment of foreign capital.

THIRD, the surplus countries, and especially the United States, should consider adopting more liberal import policies than they have followed in the past. It would help immensely if the United States could lower trade barriers without driving hard bargains in the exacting of reciprocal concessions from the deficit countries. This, no doubt, will arouse spirited opposition from the many protectionist interests in America, but America cannot benefit from a protectionism that hurts the western world community of which it is the leading part. It is to be hoped that the trade inquiry conducted by the Public Advisory Board for Mutual Security—an inquiry requested by President Truman in anticipation of the lapse of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act in 1953—will mark the beginning of an attempt to explain to the American public what its true interests are in this matter.

MERE explanation, however, will not be enough to weaken protectionist sentiment. If tariffs are lowered so that inefficient American firms are hit by increased foreign competition, the affected enterprises and local communities can legitimately claim that the burden of adjustment be borne, in part at least, by the general public. If it is in the general interest that American imports be increased, the Federal government should help hard-pressed firms and areas to find new employment in expanding industries. This is eminently fair and still to the net benefit of the nation.

Apart from lowering tariff duties, the United States could prepare the way for larger imports by rendering the Federal government—now a huge buyer of goods and services—somewhat freer than it is now to purchase foreign commodities if they are cheaper than domestic merchandise. This would, of course, require that the Buy-American Act, confining government purchases to domestic products, be repealed or drastically relaxed.



Fourth, in the field of raw-material imports, there is the matter of violent fluctuations in prices. Changing business expectations in the United States, usually leading to changes in the volume of American materials imports, are now the main cause of this price instability. The resulting fluctuations in dollar expenditures abroad are so pronounced because more than three-fourths of American imports are of materials. A proposal in the recent reports of the President's Materials Policy Commission had to do with the possible establishment of international buffer stocks. When prices of materials fell below an agreed minimum, buyers for the international buffer stocks would enter the market. Conversely, when prices exceeded an agreed ceiling, selling from the international buffer stocks would begin. Thus, violent price gyrations would be moderated without otherwise interfering with free markets and their long-run price trends.

FIFTH and finally, the west European economies would be made less vulnerable if these nations were given access to more ample gold and dollar reserves than they now have. Before the war, the gold and dollar reserves of western Europe and the sterling area were, in terms of the present purchasing power of the dollar, about $20 billion larger than they are now. Backed by such reserves, these countries were able to absorb even grave disturbances in international payments relationships. Nowadays any untoward event brings depletion to the peril point, thus forcing deficit countries to impose ever tighter restrictions in imports and external payments. If a safer margin of reserves were available, the deficit countries would enjoy immeasurably more freedom of action in adjusting to new conditions without restrictive trade and payment policies.

Alternatives

These are all seemingly drastic proposals, but they cover the situation. Three other alternatives have been suggested, but seem inadequate. One is to call the International Monetary Fund into playing a large role. But the Fund was designed for a reasonably stable world which does not now exist, and which only a broad-gauge program of the type discussed here has any possibility

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of achieving. The Fund's large membership, besides, inhibits close co-operation not only on foreign-exchange rates but also on domestic trade policy and on monetary and fiscal policy. No doubt, a revitalized Fund could make its own and far from negligible contribution to a wider program. But even in the international monetary field itself, more intimate collaboration among NATO numbers is indispensable.

Another proposed alternative is that the United States extend to Britain, and perhaps to some other west European nations, substantial stabilization loans. It is inconceivable, however, that the United States would lend such large sums without guarantees that the borrowed money would bring about a solid advance toward abandoning foreign-exchange controls. And if there were such guarantees, they might well prove unrealistic in the light of subsequent events—a possibility for which the Anglo-American Loan Agreement of 1947 supplies an ominous precedent.



The U.S. As Banker?

Finally, there has been a proposal to create an Atlantic Payments Union similar in structure and function to the European Payments Union. Here, however, the United States would soon find itself in the unenviable position perennially occupied by Belgium in the European Payments Union—accumulating larger and larger credits vis-à-vis the weakest members of the system. In the end this would amount to little more than administering foreign aid of the old type, and it would involve the United States in continuous and acrimonious bickering with its luckless debtors.

These and other similar proposals lack two main attributes that are indispensable for escaping from the present impasse: that a broad program coordinate action continuously and flexibly in all fields susceptible to constructive manipulation; and that such a system of co-operation locate and fix the responsibilities of the surplus as well as of the deficit countries.

A PROGRAM that can do these things is practicable only if membership is reasonably small. It would have to be confined to NATO partners, with other members of the sterling area attached through British membership. It might even be desirable to limit membership to a few subsystems of related nations: the United Kingdom and the sterling area, the main continental countries of western Europe (say the members of the Schuman Plan), and the United States, perhaps with Canada loosely associated.

Together, these countries account for as much as three-fourths of world trade, and theirs are the key currencies in international payments. To be sure, action in some of the policy fields discussed—especially international investment and international materials stabilization—could be effectively carried out only within the wider framework of the free world as a whole. But conduct of the over-all strategy and close co-operation on the vital questions of domestic monetary policy, trade barriers, and international payments reserves might be best undertaken by an Atlantic economic partnership.

To make this partnership work, it would probably be well to set up a common agency entrusted with important operating functions. This could give focus to the entire co-operative effort. The operating functions might be based on an Atlantic Reserve Pool of gold and dollars on which members would draw, in case of need, to supplement their own scanty reserves. Such an institution could properly co-ordinate the lending of reserves with domestic monetary and trade policies in order to overcome disturbances in the Atlantic system.

Enforced Co-operation

What is proposed in the five policies stated above is a radical departure from past practice. No country can be expected to take such steps without grave misgivings. It would be hard for European countries not to be fearful of American dominance. It would be equally hard for the United States to adopt a policy, together with the NATO powers, which many of its citizens would consider, especially in regard to tariffs, an abrogation of American domestic rights. On the other hand, during the last ten years necessity has forced many advances in international co-operation that would have been deemed incredible a score of years ago. The proposed partnership cannot be dismissed as a utopian dream before its establishment has been seriously explored and debated.

If these difficulties cannot be overcome, the United States is almost certainly condemned either to continue with its past course of subsidizing needy countries or, regardless of all consequences to American interests, to leave the rest of the free world to its own devices.

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Korean Stalemate—the War Of 'Where Do We Go From Here'

S. L. A. MARSHALL

ARTHUR DALEY, in his "Sports of The Times" column, tells how Frank Leahy, the football coach at Notre Dame, began a lecture to his squad on its disregard of fundamentals by picking up a football and saying, "This, gentlemen, is a football." He was interrupted by Ziggy Czarobski, one of the tackles. "Just a minute, coach," said Ziggy, "please don't give it to us so fast."

Right now, we could use Ziggy, or someone like Ziggy, to monitor what we are hearing about the gloomy fundamentals of the tragic problem in Korea, its evils and their cure. It is all coming at us so fast that the spectators can no longer see the game through the fog that has settled over the field.

During one forty-eight-hour period in mid-October four separate incidents illuminated the confusion by leaving it even more confounded. One citizen went to court seeking an injunction which would stop President Truman from sending any more troops to Korea. Another citizen demanded that the U.N. delegation be returned to Panmunjom under orders to agree to a truce. A third citizen urged that the South Korean Army be built up to a strength which would enable it to carry the U.N. cause alone. The fourth citizen held high the hope that Russia would call the whole game off.

THE court action was the inspiration of a Cleveland lawyer whose main claim to fame would seem to be that he didn't know a President cannot be enjoined. Since the other three ideas were floated by three aspirants to the Presidency, and have in common the assumption that there may be a better way out than bucking the line, they merit some attention.

It was Vincent Hallinan, the Progressive Party's nominee, who proposed ending the show by letting the other fellow have the goalposts. That would be the practical effect of a return to Panmunjom and a backdown on the prisoner issue. The same signal was being called by Radio Peking. One may even shed a tear with Hallinan on this subject, though for different reasons. The issue need not have been raised. We might have achieved all that we wished, protecting the people friendly to our side without jeopardizing our cause, had we been less intent on playing by the rules in a game where the other fellow has thrown the book away. But on that score it is vain to repine; the enemy would surely have hardened at some other point. Small at first, the issue now blankets the horizon. Yielding on it, our side would lose more than prestige; it would lose the war.

Whence This Defeatism?

This is not a play-by-play account. Since the second quarter, when the Korean ordeal was made a campaign issue, the subject has been discussed from one whistle stop to another. But the emphasis has always been on the way out rather than on the way through. No responsible spokesman has issued a clear call for a greater rallying by the nation and a further expanding of military power to reinforce the Korean undertaking. If the straight view of the military situation supports the logic of that reinforcement, at least neither party is willing to advocate such commitment.

For the third time since the start of the war, we are spiritually scraping

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bottom, as we did when we first saw that our arms were weak and that the North Koreans were not pushovers, and as happened again when the Chinese Communists pulled their smashing surprise on the Chongchon River.

But this time the pessimism does not stem from military reverses. Nor can it be charged to greater war weariness, since less than one per cent of the American people has had a personal stake in the battle, and the past seventeen months of operations have had the look of a practice scrimmage.

Frustration is hard enough. But when we see that our team is not only

failing to gain ground but is also fumbling the ball, it is almost more than the spirit can bear, on the gridiron or in the larger affairs of life. Is there call for any such feeling? Not in so far as it arises from the theme that Kaesong and Panmunjom were ghastly errors, well-baited traps into which our side walked blindly.

A trap, like a flying tackle, is a device that lays the other party low. The name itself implies the existence of some better alternatives. When the truce talks were undertaken, there were none. The Eighth Army, though it had been pushing north in recent weeks, was already extended beyond safe limits when major operations ceased. Its ranks were mainly the same worn veterans who had faced the enemy fire for one year. They had been promised relief.

The Breathing Space

Those who now say that this army was stopped while under full power so that truce delegates could chase a will-o'-the-wisp, and that thereby the decisive chance was lost, do not speak from knowledge of the situation. For its own well-being and safety, the Eighth Army needed the prolonged breathing space of protracted defense. That the enemy consolidated his ground and strengthened his armor in this interval was a forfeit inherent in the existing situation rather than a direct consequence of the truce talks.

The war had to change character because the Eighth Army remained too light in manpower to push forward to decisive objects. This equipoise was predetermined by the national decision, midway in the Korean War, to reinforce Europe while maintaining our strength in the going war. It could have been changed only by expanding mobilization. No one has argued for that; no responsible spokesman has said that we should have let Europe go and concentrated against Communism in Asia.

'A Nibbling War'

Whether we have lost more than we have gained through the truce-talk hiatus is not measurable in the hard terms of the present battle lines. Both sides have settled down to a war of position. Both have burrowed into artillery-proof works, and both have artillery to burn against defenses which cannot be much hurt. The seesaw action back and forth across the grid of White Horse Hill is the likely pattern for the winter fighting—intense local actions rather than full-blooded offensives. Barring a main fracture of morale on one side or the other—always a possibility—it will become what Marshal Joffre once called "a nibbling war." The U.N. advantage in airpower should be sufficient to prevent a breakthrough, but it cannot give decisive weight to a U.N. offensive against well-bunkered and wired ridgetop positions amply covered by automatic weapons and artillery.

Even though the tactical deadlock cannot be blamed on the truce talks, it is still a pressing problem. Being the kind of deadlock that could continue interminably, it calls for an examination of what matters outside the zone of fire if we are to draw a proper balance sheet on the cost of waiting while the clock runs along.

Time: Friend or Foe?

Is time on our side? If Russia and China thought that it were, there would have been a truce at Panmunjom, even on our terms. Communist China was not under pressure to save face—not after driving the forces of the world's foremost power out of North Korea.

What we gained from the prolonged slowdown is considerable. Hundreds of thousands of soldiers have had active training on or near a battlefield; there is thus provided an expanded mobilization base against any threat of the immediate future. Those who survived from the expeditionary force of the first year, and who deserved so well of their Republic, have all been rotated back. Production for war has been stimulated. In consequence of a situation very favorable to close study of our material and human resources under fire, all training has been greatly improved. That about sums up the situation.

Offsetting what we have gained by returning thousands of battle-trained reservists to the United States is the hazard that the main effective fighting strength of the nation remains locked in an indecisive area during a time of world danger. The passage of time does not necessarily increase that risk; but it cannot diminish while the war lasts.

All in all, did the type of fighting which has been carried on during the truce slowdown avail us greater relative conservation of men and fighting supply? The optimists in and out of service have professed to see it that way, pointing to the beating which Communist columns have been taking from our superior airpower. This is

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

probably an optical illusion. The lives of a few million men are relatively unimportant to a populous nation like China. As to supply, we have consumed the last of our old stocks and begun operating on current production, whereas Russia, which gave modest help to China in the first six months, can still keep the Communist side going on old stocks, being now in the process of fitting its own army with improved arms. As for Russia's expenditure of military aircraft, Russian designers and pilots have been getting more than their money's worth.

BUT the main profit for the Communists has been the maturing of the Russian-Chinese partnership, which could hardly have evolved so swiftly save for the pressures of the war. For some reason, this rapprochement has drawn less attention in this country and has been less a cause for painful brooding than the so-called death of the truce hope, which was hardly more than the burial of an infant stillborn.

We are still prone to think of China as one of the unhappy Communist satellites jumping to Russia's tune. This thought is father to the hope that there may be a Titoist sequel to the relationship. But it is a vain expectation. The impulses toward domination which compelled the Kremlin to penetrate Communist-ruled countries in eastern Europe do not apply in the case of China. A main difference is the factor of propinquity; there are also the differences of size and of culture. The temptation to dominate is not nearly so great over a long radius. Moreover, the necessity for direct penetration is far less when the immediate pull of the West on the area concerned is not present.

Since space necessitates the reducing of a complex argument to a flat statement, it is this, then—that equal partnership is possible between Russia and China but not between Moscow and a Communist-ruled country in eastern Europe. Thus, the assumption that Moscow would have to move toward domination of China—and thereby force the Chinese Communists into a choice between yielding as a satellite or cutting their connections, like Tito—is unfounded.

The new agreements between Russia and China are outwardly those of partnership. There may be frictions within this form of relationship, but the interests of both sides in maintaining it far outweigh the particular differences likely to arise between them. It gives Russia indirect means of getting at its adversaries who are agreed on containment of Russia but have not been able to act with equal effect or in equivalent agreement against China. It enables China to get away with policies far more ambitious than those that could be afforded if China were obliged to go on alone. The increased scope to the action of both partners far outweighs the inconveniences of the partnership. There is a parallel in the pre-First World War German-Austrian alliance, which greatly increased the power of both members. It was broken at last by the pressures of war, but while it stood it was one of the determinative factors in world politics.

The Russian declaration of assuming responsibility for the security of China in event of attack by Japan, with or without allies, was more explicit than anything Russia had previously stated in China's behalf. The most reasonable assumption is that Russia wanted China to continue the Korean War, and that China was in part reluctant and in part willing. The agreements covering the treaty port and the Manchurian railway are logical parts of the same pattern, though of secondary importance, the main element being the contract by which Russia provides increased support to the Chinese intervention.

So to resume the metaphor, after the long half-time wait, though the other side may be no better prepared to take the offensive and run with the ball, we may expect to see new depth to its platoon system.

On the home side, the situation is quite the reverse. Proposals are heard that nineteen-year-olds be called up and that the terms of service be lengthened. But these are not tokens of a redoubled effort. They will do no more than enable a stand in midfield by a team still lacking in reserves. Approximately three-quarters of a million men are being discharged from the Army in the current year. How to replace them in good time with trained men is a question still not solved by the Army, or faced by the Congress.

THE Eighth Army stands in front of Seoul. It stood there one year ago. It paused there two years ago. There has been much shuttling up and down country in the intervals. Like the farmer who, while motoring to the big city, kept seeing signs reading PITTSBURGH 20 MILES, we can at least praise the Lord that we are holding our own.

More than that isn't to be expected. Until there is firm assurance that fighting power can be maintained, it is pointless to discuss the possibilities of a broadened mobilization base nationally or to profess seeing any light ahead. There is no better outlook than more of the same, no brighter promise than to keep on keeping on.

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A-Frame and Carbine: The Korean Civilian

ROBERT S. ELEGANT

SEOUL

On the dirt roads of South Korea every able-bodied male over the age of ten carries either a carbine or an A-frame.

Unless he is a politician or member of the tiny middle class, the Korean male has one of two destinies. He must either fight or perform the kind of manual labor that animals or machines would do elsewhere.

The A-frame is the universal means of haulage in primitive Korea. Of rough-hewn wood, the *chige* is bound to a bearer's shoulders by two lengths of rope like knapsack straps. It carries everything from rice and firewood to artillery shells and gasoline. The short, American-made M-1 carbine is the favorite weapon of the ubiquitous policeman and soldier. Usually battered and filthy but in good firing order, the carbine is a caste emblem that sets off those who consume from those who merely produce.

For the Korean boy, childhood is a fleeting interlude between infancy and adult tasks. When he is seven or eight, his father makes him his first A-frame —a light, child-sized model that looks like a toy. But the towering loads of rice sacks and brushwood that press down the young shoulders are not toys.

The carbine comes next. The more fortunate young Koreans escape from the farmer-laborer class to become fighters, or at least gun-bearers. The most fortunate become policemen, rather than soldiers in the hard-fighting, lean-living Army of the Republic of Korea. Policemen, who number close to 200,000 in a nation of twenty million, live far better than soldiers. They also fight less (except when the Communist-led guerrillas act up), and are closer to the sources of petty graft that make such service worthwhile.

The drawings that accompany this article are from the sketchbook of Grisha Dotzenko, who made them while serving with U. N. combat forces in Korea.

Twin Burdens, Twin Threats

Between the A-frame and the carbine moves the life of this troubled peninsula, from the trenches that scar the mountains on the northern battle line to the fetid and malodorous turmoil of Pusan in the south. On the line, white-clad *chige* bearers, bent almost double under the weight of food and ammunition, inch up sixty-degree slopes to the bunkers of the main line of resistance. In the south, far-ranging Red guerrillas offer elusive targets to the carbines of the gendarmerie.

The men of Korea are bound to their loads and their weapons by the pressure of Communist armies in the North and threats of subversion against a weak central government in the South. Although provincial governors and their Cabinets are appointed by the central government without reference to the local population, crude communications and the decisive influence wielded by local army and police units effectively prevent Pusan's controlling —or even knowing—what happens in the hinterland.

Aging President Rhee recently fought to keep his office by a series of astute political moves, some legal, most extralegal. Possession of the Presidency is naturally of prime importance to the man himself and his associates, but it matters little to the lives of Koreans. Rhee won the election by an overwhelming margin, and eighty-eight



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per cent of the eligible population cast ballots. But all three major elections that have taken place in Korea since the beginning of the year have followed a set pattern.

First, nearly everybody votes. After elections for the provincial council in Taejon, newspapers and the government uncovered a major scandal: "foreign intervention in our elections." Several Chinese residents had cast ballots. One Chinese housewife, under indictment for voting, told the court:

"Yes, I voted and so did my two daughters. I thought we were supposed to. Anyway we were dressed in black Chinese clothing so that anyone could tell we weren't Koreans. The ward leader came around two days before Election Day. He gave us registration books and told us that anyone who didn't vote was a Communist. He even told us how to vote and gave us two catties of rice."

Police coercion is no longer a major feature of campaigns, but the threat is never far removed. In Taejon only one candidate criticized the government with any degree of vigor. He was dragged from the platform and imprisoned for twenty-four hours. Thereafter, criticism was muted.



All-Powerful Police

For the farmers of Korea, not the President, not even the provincial governor, but the local police chief is the key figure. Upon his efficiency, his honesty, and his whims depends the course of their lives. He is charged with protecting them from the omnipresent guerrillas, and can if he wishes restrain the rapacity of his subordinates. The army is an all too evident but nevertheless remote organism. Army trucks may descend on a small town to levy contributions of rice or of that exceedingly hot pickle relish, *kimchi,* but exactions are erratic and, in the long run, minor.

The police, living among the people, are a constant and undiminishing drain on their resources. Policemen, quartered on villagers to protect them from guerrillas, bid fair to eat their involuntary hosts out of house and home before the partisans arrive. A fish peddler entering a town knows he must present a few fish to the police sentry and a few more to the sergeant. A shopkeeper knows, almost to the penny, how much he must pay for the privilege of doing business. But the wholesale merchant enjoys no such security, unless he has a tie-up with the army, the police, or a semi-official benevolent association like the Wounded Veterans Comfort Society. The army and the police are in direct competition with merchants. In North Cholla Province, tucked away in the mountains of southwest Korea, there were famines all spring and into the summer because army and police speculators had cornered the rice supply in that fertile region.

An American adviser to the combat police explained to me how the system works: "Every week or so the chief will detach a few 'administrative trucks' for a run. They'll load up with rice here and sell most of it in Inchon up north. They'll buy fish, octopus, and seaweed in Inchon where it's cheap and then shoot across to the east coast to pick up a load of firewood. Then back down here to sell the wood, plus any other dainties they may have picked up on the way, like *kimchi,* penicillin, or blankets. Remember they're making a profit —and a big one—on every transaction, and they're not paying for the gas, the trucks, or labor."

The police and the army can corner the market because he who controls communications in Korea controls the economy—and the nation. Korea, primitive at the war's beginning, is now a country of fragments. Some provincial governors can communicate with Pusan only by code wireless that garbles messages more often than it gets them right or by biweekly flights of American-piloted Korean National Airways planes. Throughout most of Korea, it is impossible to call any point more than ten miles away by the Korean telephone system. But such matters are still far beyond the ordinary farmer, whose world is bounded by his village and occasional trips to a nearby market town.

"The average Korean," U. S. Ambassador John J. Muccio explained to me, "as long as he can raise his rice and kids, doesn't give a damn about politics or anything else.

"The real voice and the real government of South Korea," he went on, "is still the village elders. Even the tendency toward police control, which is building up again, is held in check by the fact that most of the policemen are local boys who listen to the old men. It will be a long time before elected councils—local or provincial—can provide anything but feeble sounding boards for some few Koreans."

The Women

The life of the Korean woman is governed by the fact that the Korean male is in essence rather feckless. He does what he can for his family with his A-frame or his carbine, but is not overburdened with a sense of responsibility. Along Korean roads, any time after noon, a not uncommon sight is groups of young and middle-aged men reeling along with bottles of sake tucked under their arms.

But aside from professional enter-

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tainers like the *kisang* girls and prostitutes, the Korean woman never leaves the work which keeps her close to home. The security of the family is in the hands of the sturdy, smooth-faced woman, dressed in the outrageously ugly costume of baggy trousers and short cloth jacket which leaves her breasts free to satisfy the demands of a brood of infants.

Women sort and clean the rice and cook it. Women tend the fields alongside their men, doing the dirty and monotonous work of transplanting the young shoots from seedbeds to flooded fields. Women mix and carry the thick mud which makes the adobe walls of most Korean houses. Their men delicately pat the mud into place on the woven framework and lay the straw on thatch roofs. Women even carry heavy burdens long distances, first straining and trembling to lift the ponderous bowls and bundles onto their heads. The A-frame is for masculine use only.

It is not altogether male laziness that condemns the Korean woman to an eighteen-hour workday. Aside from a somewhat exaggerated tendency to shirk responsibility, the Korean man is a hard worker. But the demands of war have left so few able-bodied young men free for civilian activities that women have been forced to take up male tasks or see their families perish.

On wooden platforms in the streets of most Korean cities stand women who have taken over men's jobs. Stocky, often bespectacled, with their hair usually hanging in the twin braids that indicate virginity, the policewomen make much show of directing the sparse traffic. Other girls, slender in drab army uniforms, serve in the Women's Army Corps of the Republic of Korea. But they are the exceptions. The backbone of the nation is the commonplace harried woman who squats by the side of a stream or irrigation ditch washing clothing, or bends over cooking pots filled with a mixture of roots, grass, and rice. Whatever security exists in this nation is shaped by her hands.

The Refugees

But for most of the Korean people security is something unknown. Many of them are living on the inept philanthropy of the United Nations, administered through the U. S. Army's Civil Assistance Command. Perhaps one-quarter of the twenty million inhabitants of South Korea are refugees living in camps or on the grudging and meager hospitality of relatives and friends.

Refugee camps sprout all over the countryside, in abandoned factories, unused schools, and vacant hospitals. The refugees, who are for the most part farmers without land, live for the regular distribution of rice and a few scraps of clothing. Their older children —boys and girls from ten to sixteen— too young to be in the army and unable to find employment, sometimes improvise games but spend most of their days in soul-rotting idleness. Sometimes the gray days are enlivened by a chance to do a little physical work or pick up a few pennies selling pitiful merchandise from roadside stalls to passersby who are almost as impoverished as the refugee children themselves. Educational facilities for them are nonexistent, and their more settled brothers and sisters are little better off. Even if there were enough teachers, the schoolhouses, favored camping sites for both United Nations and Communist armies, have been destroyed in multitudes by accidental fires.

There are gradations of misery among refugees. The least unfortunate are those who have merely moved from

one part of their own province to another quieter area. Even more pathetic and lost than the North Koreans evacuated from islands on the west coast above the 38th parallel are the "Class-C" guerrilla captives.

Captured guerrillas are divided into three classes: "A"—incorrigible Communists; "B"—the redeemable; and "C"—those who were never Communists or even sympathizers, but were forced into the ranks of the Red partisans as messengers and bearers. Old men and women for the most part, "Class-C" guerrilla prisoners are sick and wounded and lost. The provincial governments, which are responsible for their care, have managed to quarter them in unused buildings. But food supplies, coming chiefly from the United Nations Civil Assistance Command, are inadequate, and their clothing is patched, dirty, and thin. Beyond the pain of homelessness, they endure the humiliation of captivity, sitting aimlessly behind barbed wire in the pale rays of a weak sun waiting for something to happen. Death, the only practical way out, is a frequent and not unwelcome visitor.

Waiting for Something . . .

Most Koreans are waiting for something to happen, cowed by the violent

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forces that have torn their lives apart. Yet even in misery and apathy, the instinctive drive toward survival operates. Children have their roadside stalls; older refugees are immersed in petty business deals, mostly illegal. Painted whores in bright colored travesties of western-style clothing have learned to live off the troops.

It is easier for the children, who remember little but this rootless life. They are the panders, the money-changers, and the small black-marketeers amid the filth and squalor of Pusan and in the unreal calm that prevails over ruined Seoul.

In Pusan, now the seat of the national government, gray slime covers the streets and sidewalks even on sunny days, and naked beggar children sit on the ground displaying their mutilated limbs. Each day adds its share to the all-pervading filth. Twenty-four hours a day, truck convoys pound through the main streets, for Pusan is the main supply port for all United Nations troops. There is neither time nor energy to spare for cleaning up. And no one cares, because everyone from official to squatter looks only to the day when he can move northward.

Up and down the crude stone staircases that connect the different levels of the hilly city move frail old men in latticework hats of lacquered wicker. They are even more forlorn than an occasional white-faced, vacant-eyed Korean mother who passes with her child slung on her back. In a better-ordered society, the old men were sages, their wicker hats discreet symbols of wisdom. Now American soldiers—and even young Koreans—snicker at the black "bird-cage hats."

Sunday in Seoul

Pusan was caught by the backwash of war. Never occupied and never even shelled, the old city is intact. But over its former aspect—no more or less attractive than a half dozen other port cities—war has laid a miasma of refugee huts and military installations.

Seoul in the north seems to be passing a continuous Sunday afternoon. Work is so scarce that there is nothing to do but sit in the sunshine.

When summer's heat parches the dusty streets, children play or plan black-market deals among the debris. Women gossip and nurse their infants,

while old men sitting by the roadside draw on their long bamboo pipes. The only young men in Seoul are policemen and soldiers.

When it rains in Seoul, gray clouds hover over the bare hills and the inhabitants huddle in their tile-roofed houses or in makeshift shelters among the ruins. Occasionally an old man passes, a dark shape under an oiled-paper umbrella.

A WIDE boulevard runs through the former factory district toward the shattered Capitol. Factories and public buildings are windowless, pock-marked shells amid flat stretches of rubble. A twisted iron stairway, standing alone, leads upward into nothingness.

In the residential West Gate District, a sea of gray-tiled roofs covers almost undamaged houses. Rusty corrugated-iron sheeting does service for blown-out walls. On most houses, neat wooden plaques to the left of the doorway bear the owner's name in black Chinese characters. But the owners have fled and citizens live only in those houses that have paper slips reading INHABITED pasted to the doorframe.

And it's always Sunday afternoon. If Seoul were an unbombed, unshelled city and the ghosts of leveled buildings did not line the streets, it would seem that everyone was snoozing at home or walking in the park.

Occasional civilian automobiles pass, but ninety-five per cent of the traffic is military, and the military occupy every major building except the unscarred City Hall.

Civilians are not wanted in Seoul, though they persist in smuggling themselves across the Han River from the south. There is no room for more people in a city where half the population is on full-time relief. Seoul consumes but no longer produces. Its factories are in ruins and its people lethargic. Yet the homing instinct is so strong that nearly half the prewar population of 1.6 million is living in Seoul again.

Korean Crisscross

The major axis of the Republic of Korea runs from northwest to southeast along the narrow-gauge railroad that connects the former cultural and administrative center of Seoul with the commercial metropolis of Pusan. The spoke-wheeled cars snake through thickly settled farming valleys as they swing from untouched Taegu near the coast through flattened Taejon in the central plain to Seoul. Along these tracks every day rattle the grimy but spacious sleepers of the EUSAK (Eighth United States Army, Korea) Express, reserved for United Nations military personnel and Korean officers above the rank of lieutenant colonel, and civilian trains with passengers riding on the roofs and couplings. The minor axis of Korea follows a line from Mokpo in the southwest to Kosong in the northeast. At its southern pole are North and South Cholla Provinces, primitive, remote, and isolationist be-

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hind their mountain walls. Through history the Chollas have never accepted the authority of the central government, nor have they done so today. Chollans are suspicious of strangers from nearby villages, distrustful of Koreans who come from other provinces, and inclined to look upon westerners as a dangerous variety of wild beast. The successive tides of civil war swept quickly over the Chollas, leaving only the larger cities damaged, but marauding Communist guerrillas, whose general headquarters for all of South Korea are in the impenetrable mountains of the Chollas, still threaten life and property. Despite the continuing Communist menace and a short but rapacious Communist occupation, the Chollans have still not given full allegiance to the Pusan government, but they appear convinced that the Communists are still worse.

No such doubt exists at the northern end of Korea's minor axis. There, narrow Yangyang County knows the Communists well after having lived under the Red "People's Republic of Korea" from 1945 until the United Nations took the area in October, 1950. Yangyang runs about forty miles north along the east coast from the 38th parallel. The people live by farming the narrow strips of land that lie between the encroaching green mountains and the purple sea, from which they take fish.

Communist organizations controlled Yangyang completely before the North Koreans were driven out by the ROK Army, which rules under martial law today.

Communist indoctrination never penetrated the minds of the people, who knew only that the commissars requisitioned most of their rice and fish and wasted much of their time with "voluntary" meetings and "voluntary" labor for the state. Yangyang today probably enjoys the best government in all Korea under a "hands-off" policy laid down by ROK Army headquarters. This allows the people to rule themselves and to keep the major share of their own produce. When the United Nations forces were driven out of Yangyang in January, 1951, more than thirty thousand people—two-thirds of the population—fled with them to the south. In June, 1951, when ROK troops returned, only five thousand people elected to go north with the retreating Red armies.

Independent Dependents

Through economic chaos and the inevitable moral decay produced by the presence of large foreign armies—friendly or hostile—Koreans retain an imposing dignity. Individually, they are probably the most independent people on earth, although their country has been a pawn between great and aggressive neighbors for years.

This very independence and the unavoidable filth of war have scarified relations between American soldiers and Koreans. The Korean doesn't act like a "gook," though he certainly lives like one—and the G.I.'s can't quite understand it. Koreans, on the other hand, are quick to sense the disgust with which most Americans react to them and their country.

Yet some of the few Americans who have made efforts to get close to Koreans have found them more attractive than the clean but abject Japanese. Most remarkable is a generosity that gives so much out of so little to give. The Koreans will accept only relations between equals.

Despite their spirit of independence, the Koreans are a dependent people economically and will remain so for some time. They possess neither the physical resources nor the knowledge to survive alone in the modern world. Honesty in personal dealings does not serve as a substitute for an almost complete lack of the civic sense. There are few Koreans capable of managing a factory. There are even fewer who can run a nation.

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

Who Owns the Oil Under the Sea?

ALAN BARTH

NEXT YEAR'S occupant of the White House, whether he is named Stevenson or Eisenhower, is almost certain to receive from Congress a joint resolution "to Confirm and Establish the Titles of the States to Lands Beneath Navigable Waters Within State Boundaries and to the Natural Resources Within Such Lands and Waters . . ."

President Truman vetoed such a joint resolution in 1946. He vetoed another just like it in May of this year, saying, "I do not see how any President could fail to oppose it." Governor Stevenson has made it clear that he supports Mr. Truman's attitude. ". . . the base from which I must necessarily start," Stevenson has said, "is the Supreme Court decision holding that the paramount interest in oil discovered beneath these submerged lands is vested in all the people of the United States. I accept and abide by this ruling, in common with all Supreme Court decisions. The present question, therefore, is one of wise national policy in the disposition of national assets, and it does not seem wise to me to set in motion a practice of blanket cession of these or any other national assets to the individual states. I agree, therefore, with the President's veto."

The General, however, disagrees. "The attack on the tidelands is only part of the effort of the Administration to amass more power and money. So, let me be clear in my position on the tidelands and all submerged lands . . . I favor the recognition of clear legal title to these lands in each of the forty-eight states."

Oil has become an important, if not a decisive, election issue. Texas may go Republican this year out of sheer fury at Governor Stevenson's statement; at any rate Governor Shivers and other Texas politicians have said that they will bolt the regular Democratic ticket. But at least one astute political forecaster, Harry S. Truman, scoffs at the threat. The situation in Texas, he told a news conference some time ago, is that a great many people down there are neither oil-well owners nor millionaires.

Golden Waves

Political orators on both sides have tended to describe the controversy as one between a Federal Mossadegh named Truman and a states' rights Mossadegh named Shivers, fighting to the death over $40 billion worth of loot. The actual production of oil, of course, would be carried on by private enterprise in any event. The only argument is over who shall grant the leases to private concerns and who shall collect the royalties.

No suit ever argued before the United States Supreme Court has involved so much money. Geologists have estimated that the known petroleum resources lying under the coastal waters of California, Louisiana, and Texas are worth about $40 billion. Starting about twenty years ago, when oil began to be produced in appreciable quantity off California, the governments of these states began to lease offshore lands to petroleum prospectors as a matter of course, since it was universally acknowledged that the individual states had complete control over their inland waters. Meanwhile, offshore oil has become a rich source of revenue to the three state treasuries, and the major oil companies having offshore leases prefer to continue doing business with the easy-going state governments rather than with the Federal government. Even so ferocious a protector of the national domain as the late Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes took it for granted that this oil lay properly within state jurisdiction and outside Federal authority.

Late in the 1930's, however, it was suggested to Ickes that a large portion of the offshore lands containing oil might lie outside navigable inland waters and therefore outside state jurisdiction. He and the then Attorney General brought suit, first in a Federal district court, then directly in the Supreme Court, to determine what authority the United States could properly assert in this area.

Defining Terms

The very term "tidelands" is a complete misnomer as it is generally applied. "Tidelands," properly speaking, means the strip of land that is submerged when the tide is in and exposed when it is out. This land is not involved in any way in the contest between the states and the Federal government. The states have indisputable title to the tidelands adjacent to their respective seacoasts. The Federal government does not dispute this title.

Neither does it raise the slightest question as to state ownership of "inland waters"—the rivers, lakes, bays, and ocean areas within coastal indentations—as distinguished from the

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open sea. The President, the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Interior, and every other interested Federal official has categorically and redundantly renounced any claim whatever to such areas. Moreover, a long line of Supreme Court decisions going back for more than a century has held uniformly that inland waters and tidelands belong to the states. The point was unequivocally restated in the Court's recent ruling on the subject.

The correct term to apply to the controversial area is "marginal sea." This constitutes the area lying seaward of the low-tide mark out to the traditional three-mile limit of national sovereignty. It is this area—and this area alone—concerning which the Supreme Court declared, first in the California case in 1947 and again in the Louisiana and Texas cases in 1950, that the states had no title and that the United States possessed paramount rights.

Beyond the marginal sea and the three-mile limit, the edge of the North American continent extends for varying distances into the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Gulf of Mexico—at some

places for a distance of 250 miles. This indefinite area of submerged land is known as the "continental shelf." President Truman issued a proclamation in 1945 asserting to the rest of the world that the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf off the U.S. coast "appertain to the United States, and are subject to its jurisdiction and control." No foreign government has challenged this assertion. But some of the coastal states of the Union have claimed ownership of the continental shelf—that is to say, extension of their state boundaries—to various distances seaward, for twenty-seven miles in the case of Louisiana and more in that of Texas.

It is important to understand just what the Supreme Court said in addition to just what area it dealt with in its marginal-sea decisions. The crux of the Federal government's suit against California was a distinction between tidelands or inland waters on the one hand and the marginal sea on the other. Acknowledging that state ownership of tidelands and inland waters had long been established, the Federal government contended that this did not include the open ocean and that title to the marginal sea, therefore, had never been determined. The Supreme Court accepted this distinction, declaring explicitly that the question of the marginal sea was brought before it in this case for the first time.

Dominion over Wave and Well

As for the marginal sea, the Court said not only that California had no title now but that California had never had any title. Ownership of land beneath ocean waters (as distinguished from inland waters) is a matter of international law. The Court did not say that title was vested in the United States. It said simply this: "Now that the question is here, we decide for the reasons we have stated that California is not the owner of the 3-mile belt along its coast, and that the Federal Government, rather than the State, has paramount right in and power over that belt, an incident to which is full dominion over the resources of the soil under that water area, including oil."

The Court came to this conclusion in large measure on the ground that "Not only has acquisition, as it were, of the 3-mile belt been accomplished by the National Government, but protection and control of it has been and is a function of national external sovereignty." It would seem to be the view of the Court, in brief, that national sovereignty and dominion over any part of the open ocean are inseparable.

California and Louisiana never possessed national sovereignty and therefore could never have possessed the marginal sea, let alone any further portion of the continental shelf. The same can be said of all the other states of the Union with the exceptions of Texas and Florida. For nine years before entering the Union by compact, Texas was an independent and sovereign republic, undoubtedly possessing the rights of sovereignty over the submerged lands at least to a distance of three leagues from its shore. By the Supreme Court's logic, however, Texas inevitably relinquished these rights when it relinquished sovereignty, transferring them to the sovereign United States.

WHATEVER the merits or demerits of this reasoning may be—and three Justices dissented from the majority view—the Supreme Court's opinion stands as an unquestionably authoritative determination of the Federal-state controversy. Indeed, the Supreme Court was expressly created under the Constitution to resolve just this kind of controversy. The lawsuit has been won by the Federal government; and so far as the law is concerned, there can be no reasonable doubt as to the Federal government's supremacy over the marginal sea.

But California, Louisiana, and Texas have sought to accomplish through the legislative and executive branches of the government what they could not accomplish through its judicial branch. On two occasions they have persuaded Congress, though not the President, to quitclaim, or renounce title to, the marginal sea—and, incidentally, to portions of the rest of the continental shelf for good measure. This legislation has been expressed in terms of giving back to the states their rightful possessions, or confirming titles that a misguided Supreme Court has slightly

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clouded. But what it amounts to, of course, is an outright gift by the Federal government of land that the Supreme Court says belongs to the country as a whole.

The pretense of the legislation passed by Congress in its last session—that it aims merely "to Confirm and Establish" state titles—is at best disingenuous. If, as the Supreme Court has declared, the states never had any title to the marginal sea, confirmation is an impossibility.

Of course, Congress can confirm state titles to inland waters. But there is not much point in confirming what is unquestioned. The motive that led the President to veto the "tidelands oil" bill last May was that it did not confine itself to tidelands but aimed to stake out a state claim to a much wider area. In his veto message, Mr. Truman said: "If the Congress wishes to enact legislation confirming the States in the ownership of what is already theirs—that is, the lands and resources under navigable inland waters and the tidelands—I shall, of course, be glad to approve it. But such legislation is completely unnecessary, and bears no relation whatever to the question of what should be done with lands which the States do not now own—that is, the lands under the open sea."

Divers Proposals

The Justice Department and the Department of the Interior have submitted to Congress their own joint proposal as to what should be done about the marginal sea, since legislation is still necessary to authorize Federal management of the domain. Their proposal is in many respects an extremely generous one. It would validate all the leases made by the states—acknowledging these to have been entered into in good faith, even though a considerable number were entered into after the Supreme Court's California case decision. And it would give to the coastal states, in recognition of their dependence upon this source of revenue, 37.5 per cent of all the royalties reaped from exploitation of the marginal sea adjacent to their shores. At the same time, this legislation would authorize the President to reserve any unleased lands of the continental shelf in the interest of national security. Since the United States has now become an oil-importing nation, conservation of this sort may become vital for the country's defense.

But Congress did not even give this proposal serious consideration. Neither did it pay any real attention to an imaginative and appealing solution put forward by Senator Lister Hill (D., Alabama) in behalf of a distinguished bipartisan group of colleagues. Their idea was to dedicate the anticipated revenue from the submerged oil to the long-range education of the nation's children—all of its children, not merely those of California, Louisiana, and Texas. Thus they would strike simultaneously at two major national problems—the "tidelands oil" controversy and the desperate need of the public-school system for financial aid. As Senator Hill outlined the plan, it would embrace the Administration's offer of 37.5 per cent directly to the coastal states; and temporarily, while the national emergency continues, money derived from oil would be used only for urgent national defense purposes. A national advisory council on grants in aid of education would be established to recommend a program for allocation of 62.5 per cent of the revenue in support of the country's schools and universities. Perhaps the dramatic potentialities of a $40-billion fund will rally the country's educators to an effective backing of the Hill proposal.

Congress has shown scant interest even in the compromise proposal made by Democratic Senators Joseph C. O'Mahoney of Wyoming and Clinton P. Anderson of New Mexico for an interim settlement of the dispute. This would give the coastal states 37.5 per cent of the marginal-sea revenue and put the balance in escrow for a five-year period during which a permanent settlement might be achieved. The greatest virtue of this proposal is that it would enable leasing and exploitation of offshore oil to be carried forward in orderly fashion.

The Present Impasse

As matters stand today, neither the states nor the Federal government can grant leases with any real authority, and oil companies interested in drilling in the marginal sea are left in uncertainty—an impasse that presents a serious impediment to national defense.

The executive branch of the government cannot undertake any program for the orderly management and development of the marginal sea without the consent of Congress. Congress cannot give away this national asset to the coastal states without the consent of the President—unless, of course, the spokesmen for the states should be able to corral enough votes to override a Presidential veto. They are waiting, it would seem, for a President more compliant than Mr. Truman. Despite General Eisenhower's present views, Mr. Truman may prove to be right in saying that no President could fail to oppose this relinquishment of an inheritance belonging to all the people of the United States.

For the present, the coastal oil states hold the whip hand. They can frustrate any settlement just as long as they can convince the Representatives of the inland states that their own title to inland waters has been clouded by the Supreme Court. But as the issue becomes more clearly understood by the general public, it seems unlikely that Congress will be allowed to place sectional advantage ahead of the national welfare. The members of Congress are not mere ambassadors from their states. In this situation, they are trustees of a tremendous national asset.

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Saving Los Angeles From the U. N.

MARK A. HENNESSEY

LAST AUGUST the Los Angeles Board of Education banned a pamphlet entitled "The E in UNESCO," which had been prepared by the local school administration in 1949 to explain the workings and aims of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization to Los Angeles teachers. The action was taken at the insistence of a rancorous and highly vocal minority over the repeated public protests of the superintendent of schools, Alexander J. Stoddard. Stoddard was joined in his protests by parent-teacher associations, the League of Women Voters, various Protestant and Jewish groups, one Catholic organization, Rotary International, the AFL and CIO, the Quakers, Democratic and Republican leaders, distinguished citizens like Paul Hoffman, and an estimated 800-to-1 majority of the general public. The extraordinary success of minority rule in this case is another of those civic mysteries which make life in Los Angeles the bracing experience that it is.

On October 24, 1951, a Miss Florence Fowler Lyons informed Los Angeles' five major newspapers that she intended to address a local organization, the Southern California Republican Women, on the general subject "Subversion in the Los Angeles Public Schools." The announcement, one of many unsolicited handouts received by local editors that day, had a cranky tone that most newspapermen in cult-ridden Southern California have long since learned to recognize.

But for some as yet unexplained reason, Miss Lyons's announcement brought spectacular results among city editors. Reporters and cameramen were sent running from the home-owned *Times* and *Mirror* and the Hearst-owned *Examiner* and *Herald & Express*. They found Miss Lyons to be a thin, angry-looking, middle-aged woman with a vigorously professional platform manner.

"The children of Los Angeles are being fed daily doses of Communism, socialism, and New Dealism!" she announced in a deep voice. "And something else has been added by Dr. Alexander J. Stoddard—doses of pro-World Government propaganda. Our children," cried the childless Miss Lyons, "are being educated as faceless citizens of the world!"

The UNESCO mystery was under way.

Paul Hoffman

Overnight, Miss Lyons, who described herself as "a writer and researcher," achieved status. She was invited to enlarge upon her views on television programs. Her views, in essence, were that Los Angeles schoolchildren should be taught nothing about the United Nations, on the ground that such teaching stressed a one-world philosophy over Americanism. Specifically, Miss Lyons demanded that "The E in UNESCO," which she said was loaded with pro-world government slantings, be withdrawn.

Liberty Belles, Native Sons

Miss Lyons was taken up by one local organization after another, as though her emergence had been widely anticipated. The Liberty Belles, a national organization headed by Miss Vivien Kellems, one of whose objectives is the repeal of the Sixteenth (income-tax) Amendment to the Constitution, adopted her cause; so did the Grand Parlor Americanism Committee, Native Sons of the Golden West; so did the Small Property Owners League, the Los Angeles Women's Breakfast Club, a local Catholic women's club called the American Public Relations Forum, and the local branch of the Freedom Clubs. The Reverend James W. Fifield, Jr., pastor of Los Angeles' First Congregational Church and a man of consequence among the consequential, announced on his weekly radio program that "the fight against pagan UNESCO" had his unqualified support.

Miss Lyons's success aroused other previously unpublicized Los Angeles women. Mrs. Helen J. Keating, representing the Women's Breakfast Club, appeared before the school board to demand that a series of UNESCO reference booklets, entitled "Toward World Understanding," be banned because it "attempts to create world citizens out of American children with American taxpayers' money."

Where or how Mrs. Keating, a petite but emphatic woman, had heard about the "Toward World Understanding" booklets was rather puzzling. There were fewer than a dozen sets of them in Los Angeles. Like "The E in UNESCO," they were not for student or public use, although anyone might see

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them for the asking. Few teachers had seen them. But Mrs. Keating, a housewife, had, and she had struck a highly workable vein. Soon after UNESCO's formation, it had launched a series of seminars in various countries. Out of these seminars had come booklets (literal reports of what delegates to the seminars had had to say) which had been sent to educators all over the world with the notation that they did not in any way represent official UNESCO policy. The "Toward World



Gerald L. K. Smith

Understanding" series, the product of a seminar held in Czechoslovakia with Communist delegates in attendance, contains the following observations: "Frequently, the family infects the child with nationalism"; "As long as the child breathes the poisoned air of nationalism, education for world-mindedness can achieve only precarious results"; and "kindergarten . . . can correct the errors of home training and prepare the child for membership . . . in a world society . . ."

So WORKABLE was this new vein that the spotlight presently shifted away from Miss Lyons to Mrs. Keating. "The E in UNESCO" actually reflected the highly cautious views of one of the most cautious school systems in the nation. About all Miss Lyons had to go on, really, was the chapter on human rights, which suggested that while the United States is "a leader in the field of human liberties," some peoples in the nation were not yet quite so free as they might be.

Mrs. Keating got splendid coverage in the Los Angeles *Times* and the Hearst papers. Other men and women began making statements to the school board. Sheer forensic power distracted attention from the fact that very few people, representing very few people, were making all the furore. Action generated reaction, of course, and presently parent-teacher groups, women's clubs, educators, parents, and students who supported UNESCO were petitioning the board for hearings.

All this excitement naturally aroused the curiosity of many parents of Los Angeles schoolchildren. In reading the *Herald & Express,* which had made a campaign out of the charges, they found to their surprise that the city was in arms against "the sly, subversive literature of UNESCO." The *Examiner* was not quite so colorful. The *Times,* easily the most influential paper in town, seemed to find it unnecessary to take an editorial position on the matter —an attitude that was tantamount to taking such a position, since the paper usually ran what the attackers had to say before printing any rebuttals.

Stoddard's Retreat

Other papers, including the Democratic *Daily News,* which jumped in at once on the pro-UNESCO side, kept picturing a kind of mass battle between people who wanted "the UNESCO program removed from school curriculums" and people who wanted it to stay. This confused the school authorities, who kept pointing out to no avail that no course on the United Nations or UNESCO had ever been taught in the schools. They also called attention to the fact that the United Nations had the support of both houses of Congress, and that Senator Robert A. Taft and Representative (now Senator) Karl Mundt had been among the supporters of UNESCO. But the noise got louder and louder.

By January, things had reached such a pass that Dr. Stoddard ordered "The E in UNESCO" "withdrawn for review." Later in the month, he announced that a UNESCO-sponsored high-school essay contest had been dropped. Since no other school system in the nation had found it necessary to discontinue this essay contest, Stoddard's action was promptly interpreted by the pro-UNESCO people as a "capitulation to the forces of bigotry, medieval ignorance and superstition." Dr. Stoddard made no reply.

There were formidable reasons for Dr. Stoddard's retreat. A $146-million school-bond issue was to go before the

voters on June 3, 1952, and bad publicity for himself or his staff would probably endanger its passage. The money was desperately needed. Some five hundred new schoolchildren enter classes in Los Angeles every Monday morning. In the city's eight hundred square miles are 430 elementary schools, high schools, and junior colleges. Dr. Stoddard has over four hundred thousand regular and fifty-seven thousand adult students to think about, not to mention some thirteen thousand teachers, over nine thousand other employees, a plant valued at almost $250 million, a yearly budget approaching $112 million, and the problem of more than fifteen thousand students on half-day sessions.

Beyond this, the Los Angeles school board had just been through a top-to-bottom reorganization following a memorable series of scandals. Of its seven members, two had been removed, one had quit under fire, and two others had been defeated for re-election after revelations of collusion with people who did business with the school system. (One member's husband, for example, had handled a great deal of school insurance.) That left two members, Earl Baker and Mrs. Eleanor Allen, with presentable records. But Baker had been elected to the City Council, and Mrs. Allen had quit after the papers disclosed that she had endorsed a machine that was supposed to cure any disease by remote control if only the sufferer would thrust in a slip of paper with a drop of his blood on it.

By association, these goings-on had shaken public confidence in the board and in the school administration as a

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whole. So, even though the curriculum division had made a long study of "The E in UNESCO" and had recommended that it be kept in use, the superintendent of the second largest school system in the United States retreated before the attacks of Miss Lyons and Mrs. Keating.

The Sniping Resumes

After the withdrawal of the booklet and the cancellation of the UNESCO high-school essay contest, some of the steam seemed to go out of the campaign. It was revived briefly and bitterly before the school-bond vote, but after most of the latter program was approved, relative quiet returned. Then, in midsummer, for no discernible reason, the attack began more fiercely than ever.

The new movement had some new leaders. One of them was Mrs. Stephanie Williams, president of the American Public Relations Forum, an organization that had "the express approval" of Los Angeles Archbishop Francis A. McIntyre. Mrs. Williams informed the school board and others that UNESCO would abolish the Catholic schools and that it promoted birth control. She was wrong on both counts. It is true that the World Health Organization once suggested that birth control might benefit some countries, but WHO's family connection with UNESCO does not permit it to set policy for the other organization, a fact of which Mrs. Williams seemed unaware.

Miss Lyons, who was one of the first speakers invited to address the group, said that UNESCO advocated the teaching in public schools of things too unspeakable even to be mentioned in genteel company. Presumably she referred to courses in sex education, but since she didn't say so, the ladies' imaginations were allowed full range. Mrs. Williams was soon in greater demand for television, radio, press interviews, and general speaking engagements than any of her predecessors.

The first anti-UNESCO campaign had been carried on largely by individuals and obscure organizations. The second brought in better-known groups—the Junior League, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, and the American Legion. Pasadena members of the Junior League, led by a woman who happened to be a relative of the leader of a Los Angeles group investigating "subversion in textbooks," complained about the "Toward World Understanding" series. The others demanded permanent withdrawal of "The E in UNESCO."

The second campaign brought an infinitely larger volume of protest from the pro-UNESCO forces than the first had, with the result that school-board meetings became even more frenzied than those of the City Council, which was writing a first-class civic mystery story of its own in its daily attempts to wriggle out of a $110-million public-housing contract between the city and the Federal government.

Pipeline to Gerald L. K. Smith?

Reports of board meetings caused those who were beginning to suspect a pattern in the attacks to ask some questions. A few inevitable ones were these: Was there any financial or policy connection among local anti-UNESCO campaigners? Who was behind them? Were they getting outside advice?

These were pretty good questions. Gerald L. K. Smith, that durable peddler of racial hate, seemed to have some influence in the anti-UNESCO crusade. He certainly had influence with the tent-meeting core of the shock troops, some of whom could not conceal their anti-Semitic urges at board meetings. Whether they knew it or not, Smith was behind all those who argued that the United Nations was a plot to establish a world organization that would destroy American sovereignty, and that UNESCO was designed to help the plot along by teaching disloyalty to children, poisoning the minds of teachers, and preaching the abandonment of nationalism for the adoption of a world government. Smith had invented these arguments in his Christian Nationalist Crusade headquarters in St. Louis—as fine a service to Russia, which banished UNESCO long ago, as could be imagined.

The influence of Smith at least overshadowed that of Mrs. Stephanie Williams. In early summer, Mrs. Williams had created a press sensation by exhibiting a blown-up reproduction of the Red Army flag and the U.N. flag at a meeting of the American Public Relations Forum. The flags were similar in design, and the implication was that Mrs. Williams had discovered what she called the "dead-giveaway likeness." Some days before this, Smith had mailed out handbills with pictures of the two flags on them, plus instructions on how the similarity between them might be "exploited for our cause."

ALLEN H. ZOLL—ex-head of an outfit called American Patriots (which was listed by the Attorney General as subversive), and president of the National Council for American Education, which helped engineer the ousting of Dr. Willard Goslin, superintendent of schools in Pasadena—was also a valued assistant in the anti-UNESCO camp. Mrs. Keating, for one, was influenced by Zoll's works. In arousing the local branch of the Delphians, a national women's study group of which she was once president, against the dangers of UNESCO, Mrs. Keating suggested that the group set up panel discussions on the general subject of public education. When everyone agreed, Mrs. Keating knit her brows, trying to think of a name for the panel discussions. "Let's call it 'Our Schools and Our Children,'" she said at last. Then, after more concentration, Mrs. Keating came up with titles for panel subtopics:

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"Textbooks and Teachers," "The Three R's vs. Progressive Education," "Socialism and Communism in the Schools," and "Integrating the Child to School, Home and Church." The ladies of the Delphian Society were all impressed with Mrs. Keating's inventiveness until one of them happened to recall that the authorship of all these titles had been attributed to Zoll in a national magazine some weeks before. That evening Mrs. Keating resigned from the Delphians.

The local branch of a growing national organization, the Freedom Clubs, had also come out against UNESCO. This brought in the Reverend Dr. James W. Fifield on a second front, and the Reverend Doctor brought with him a maze of connections. Dr. Fifield, a wealthy and zealous patriot, was founder not only of the Freedom Clubs but also of another equally dedicated national right-wing organization, Spiritual Mobilization.

Fifield's Fertile Field

The basic philosophy of Spiritual Mobilization, which seeks to organize Protestant ministers against "pagan statism," is this: "I am only what is mine; I am the sum of the material things I possess and control." Critics have said that this proposition comes about as close to dialectical materialism as a Christian is likely to come while still remaining Christian, and that it is particularly surprising issuing from a group founded and controlled by a clergyman, since it seems to rule out the soul. But the Spiritual Mobilizers have another interpretation. If, speaking practically, a man is but the sum of what he possesses and controls, it follows that taxes, which take from his possessions, are a violence against himself, and are therefore sinful, as are all the products of taxes—the post office, roads, the Army, public schools, and so on.

For many people, the entrance of Dr. Fifield into the fray sealed UNESCO's doom in Los Angeles. He is known to be well and widely connected. In 1950, for example, the board of the Chrysler Corporation voted six thousand dollars to Spiritual Mobilization, and in 1944 the Doctor got a fifty-thousand-dollar check after addressing a meeting of the National Association of Manufacturers. The advisory committee of his Freedom Clubs includes Bing Crosby, Cecil B. De Mille, Eddie Rickenbacker, Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, Fulton Lewis, Jr., and Erle Cocke, Jr., past commander of the American Legion.

Along with Dr. Fifield, other important individuals and groups joined the anti-UNESCO campaign in its closing days last August. The campaign had the direct or indirect approval of the Anglo-Saxon Christian Congregation, which was founded by Wesley Swift, a former KKK organizer and West Coast agent of Gerald L. K. Smith; of America Plus, an organization founded by California State Senator Jack Tenney, which is now planning an initiative to repeal the civil-rights section of the California code and to forbid fair-employment laws; of the Wage Earners Committee, which is dedicated to the abolition of the United Nations; of the Partisan Republicans, an anti-Eisenhower-anti-Stassen-anti-Warren group that has even been repudiated by Senator Taft; and of many other small but violently vocal organizations. The anti-UNESCO campaign also had the support of the local Archdiocese of the Roman Catholic Church and the Knights of Columbus. Both Archbishop McIntyre and the K. of C. backed Mrs. Williams's argument that UNESCO advocated birth control.

All the pro-UNESCO forces had behind them was the support of most of the city's large semi-political, educational, and religious organizations, plus an overwhelming majority of the parents of Los Angeles schoolchildren, who kept after the board with speakers and letters demanding that "The E in UNESCO" be kept in circulation.

At the school board's final hearing on August 25, the pro-UNESCO people had mustered a formidable list of speakers, headed by Paul Hoffman, former ECA administrator and director of the Ford Foundation. Hoffman was booed and heckled by the anti-UNESCO people so much that he had to send his speech to the board by letter next day.

On August 29, the great UNESCO mystery story, which had succeeded in baffling most of the people of Los Angeles for over a year, ended as no good mystery story should—by baffling them still further. Ignoring the majority, the school board decided that "The E in UNESCO" was not "an impartial and factual presentation of a controversial matter," and banned the booklet permanently.

If Dr. Stoddard's teachers' manual were all that was involved in this action, or if the situation in Los Angeles were an isolated example, the strange death of "The E in UNESCO" might not be so disturbing.

But shortly after the board's vote, the Los Angeles committee to investigate subversion in textbooks announced that it was going right ahead with its work. Then Dr. Stoddard announced in the press that his term as a director of the American Association for the United Nations was up, and that he wouldn't be in the organization any more. Then, in nearby Long Beach, a traveling evangelist named Dr. Russell Brougher and a Miss Fanchon Batelli, identifying themselves as spokesmen for the Friday Morning Discussion Club, the Southern California Republican Women, and the Liberty Belles, arrived at a meeting of that city's school board "to register an emphatic protest against the teaching of UNESCO principles in the Long Beach schools . . ."

Board president Dr. Dwight Sigworth, said the *Times*, "assured the group that a detailed study of the various arguments would be made."

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The Great Crusade And the Hot Bath

ALFRED FRIENDLY

THE CAMPAIGN speeches of General Eisenhower that are best and most widely known are, of course, the formal ones delivered in the big cities, broadcast nationally by radio and television, and printed in their entirety by a dozen or so newspapers throughout the country. They may be taken to reflect most accurately the position of the Eisenhower headquarters hierarchy. They may even reflect the candidate's own views, although that is debatable. But they are certainly not the most precise representations of either Eisenhower's personality or his thinking.

For, as one of his aides artlessly observed, those speeches, the ones read from prepared scripts, "come from New York." Which is to say, they are custom built by the headquarters speech factory. Conceivably Eisenhower suggests the theme and part of the development in some; as to others, the most charitable assumption is that he has had nothing whatsoever to do with them prior to the moment he takes the rostrum to read them.

Hot-Bath Effect

But the back-platform talks—those five-to-fifteen-minute chats from the rear car of the campaign train, or on the courthouse square after the motorcade from the station, which are reported but briefly or only in the local papers—are indisputably Ike's own. His advisers on the train may have suggested some of the metaphors (the egg with a hundred taxes on it) and some of the phrases and the nifties ("common, woodshed honesty," Democratic officeholders "too small for their jobs and too big for their breeches"). But the ensemble, the organization, the way of thinking and speaking are the genuine, home-grown, don't-accept-substitutes Eisenhower product.

The typical chat—and one is more typical than the next—is worth analyzing.

On the one hand, it has the characteristics of a good hot bath; it is soothing, comforting, relaxing. It guarantees that things will be better when the G.O.P. comes to power. No more waste and extravagance. Lowering of high taxes. A life that will not be broken up by husbands' and fathers' being torn from their families to go to war. A government that is careful and frugal and that thus will make America strong—"spiritually, intellectually, morally strong."

But on the other hand, the speech also contains an appeal that is flattering. If not rudely exciting, it nevertheless leaves the listener with a nobly satisfying feeling of participation in a mighty work. Each audience, each individual in it, is invited to "join in the



moral crusade which I have the honor of leading." Joining is simple and painless; it entails only the raising of a cheer and the casting of a vote.

IT IS NOT quite correct to say, as some have, that the average audience does not listen to Ike. A more accurate statement is that it listens with half an ear. It certainly does not follow the argument (there is precious little argument to follow), but it hears, and cheers, such catchwords as "high taxes," "waste," "corruption," and "Communist influence in government."

The trust that the crowd in the station yard places in Ike's program is wondrous and not easily explained. The pledges, after all, are of truly sensational accomplishments: lower taxes but greater military security; balanced budget but impregnable defenses; correction of too-low hog, lard, and soy-bean prices but a halt to inflation; social security but no government intervention; freedom of opportunity, national solvency, "getting this question of peace in the world on the right track," and doing something about ending the Korean War.

Papa Ike

The "how" of the promised achievements is not discussed in the back-platform speech. There is never an exposition of the concrete steps that will bring peace, prosperity, and honest tax collecting. Nor is there mention of the names of the "fine people" and honest ones who will come to Washington with a G.O.P. victory to do the job right—except, of course, the local team of Republican candidates at that moment appearing with Ike on the platform.

Some observers profess to find a hint of why Ike succeeds in evoking such confidence in the fact that his usual daytime audience contains so many young people, from eight to eighteen. This is seen as symbolic.

The suggetion is that, to the children literally and to the adults figuratively, Ike has the appeal of a father. Indeed, the speeches from the back of the Eisenhower Special sound like a kind of paternal declaration that all Americans will be rescued from their wicked and tear-drenched foster home, where tension and worries and hateful favoritism abound, and will be transported into a family of their own flesh and blood, where all men are good, where father is a loving and, above all, reliable protector, and where the doors will be bolted securely against the rascals outside. A decade ago, many of Eisenhower's present supporters, in campaigning against F.D.R., warned Americans of dependence on such a father figure. Now, for a new and different public, Ike may be filling the void.

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The Pentagon's Castles in Spain



THEODORE DRAPER

As a result of pressure by the Spanish Lobby and vacillating policies in the Pentagon, the United States faces one of the most humiliating and costly diplomatic fiascoes since the war. That this will most probably be the fate of the current U.S.-Spanish negotiations became my deep conviction during a recent visit to Spain.

Ever since April, the United States and Spain have been trying to negotiate a military-economic agreement. When the idea was first seriously broached in 1949, the State Department was not enthusiastic. Nor were our main Allies, Britain and France. Until the outbreak of the Korean War in June, 1950, the State Department refused to be steamrollered.

The North Korean attack tipped the balance in favor of Franco. If the Communist aggression was the opening shot in an all-out general war—and this is what it seemed to many responsible political and military officials at the time—every possible ally had to be accepted, even as Soviet Russia itself was accepted in the all-out war against the fascist Axis.

Congress, or rather a hard core of pro-Franco Congressmen, took advantage of the opening. Senators like Pat McCarran of Nevada and Owen Brewster of Maine and Representatives like Alvin E. O'Konski of Wisconsin pushed through an outright loan of $62.5 million to Spain in August, 1950. The Administration responded to the pressure. To the end, President Truman opposed the credits. But when Congress authorized them, he went along. Again, when the U.N. General Assembly was about to lift the ban on ambassadors to Spain in November, 1950, the President told a press conference that it would be a "long, long time" before the United States would send one. Two weeks later, the President said that he was reluctant to appoint an ambassador but perhaps could be convinced of the necessity. The "long, long time" turned out to be the end of December.

But it was the choice of the U.S. envoy, Stanton Griffis, a banker and a generous contributor to Democratic campaign funds, that proved the giveaway. Griffis had already carried out one assignment in appeasement in Buenos Aires for the greater glory of Juan Domingo Perón—carried it out a little too enthusiastically, to be sure, even for those who had sent him to do it. Now Griffis was picked for a repeat performance on a larger scale.

As the first American ambassador in five years, entrusted with the delicate job of re-establishing friendly relations, Griffis was a minor catastrophe. To his predilection for totalitarian dictators he added a trait of personal clownishness. The Spaniards tolerated him because they knew that he was playing their game, but he made himself a laughingstock, and American prestige suffered accordingly.

One of the printable Griffisisms that I heard involved his 1951 Christmas card. It contained two photographs, one showing Griffis presenting his credentials to Franco, the other showing Griffis inspecting some bulls. Under the first was the inscription: "The American Ambassador presents his credentials to the Head of State." And under the second: "A young bull presents his credentials to the American Ambassador."

When I asked an official in the Spanish Foreign Ministry what he thought of such diplomatic antics, he "defended" Griffis as follows: "Ah, that was nothing. In the twenties, you had an ambassador here who sent the Queen a new type of hot-water bottle with a note: 'Dear Queen—This will keep you warm while Alfonso is away.' "

When Griffis finally left last January, the Madrid correspondent of the *Times* of London gave him this send-off: "During his stay of barely ten months he earned and evidently enjoyed a singular reputation for flouting social and diplomatic conventions with bluntly outrageous jokes." Fortunately, Griffis was replaced by Lincoln MacVeagh, one of the ablest career men in the Foreign Service, before the present negotiations began. Ambassador MacVeagh is just as close-mouthed as Griffis was loquacious.

The Navy Sails In

But if the atmosphere was prepared by a battery of paid and unpaid lobbyists, the serious business of negotiation had to have more serious sponsorship. This was supplied in the summer of 1951 by the Pentagon.

The late Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, then U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, fervently believed in the necessity of U.S.-Spanish military collaboration. Admiral Sherman convinced President Truman that it was worth at least a try, and he was given the assignment of

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finding out for himself. The Sherman mission to Franco in July, 1951, really set the present negotiations in motion.

The dramatic mission of such a high-ranking officer naturally led to the conclusion that the U.S. had made up its mind. It was even interpreted by some as the decisive step toward a far-reaching alliance. Actually, much less was involved. Admiral Sherman merely asked Franco whether Spain was willing to explore the problem of military collaboration. Franco replied positively. The sudden death of Admiral Sherman a week later in Naples deprived the Franco Lobby in Washington of its most important disinterested sympathizer.

THE State Department went along, still without enthusiam. Twenty-four hours after Sherman had conferred with Franco, Secretary Acheson washed his hands publicly of all responsibility by attributing the "tentative and exploratory conversations" solely to the views of the "military authorities." One thing was painfully clear. The political and moral aspects of a Spanish agreement were not going to be permitted to take precedence over the strategic. Any negotiation would be the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

But after Admiral Sherman's departure, the Joint Chiefs floundered. It was one thing to say that Spain enjoyed a strategic position of incalculable significance and how wonderful it would be if we could take advantage of it. It was quite another thing to struggle through the deep and stubborn swamp of problems which any far-reaching co-operation with the Franco régime must inevitably involve. The Joint Chiefs had to play for time. Instead of following up Admiral Sherman's mission with direct negotiations, two other American missions, of a strictly informative nature, were sent to Spain. Major General James W. Spry of the Air Force headed a military group to report on the Spanish military situation. Professor Sidney C. Sufrin of Syracuse University conducted an economic survey for the Mutual Security Agency. Spry was finished by November 1 and Sufrin in December, but more time had to elapse before they sent in their final reports.

It was not until March of this year that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had worked out a basic policy decision. Though the formal negotiations in Madrid got started on April 14, the U.S. proposals were not submitted in finished form until the end of May. It had taken the Joint Chiefs about ten months to follow up on Admiral Sherman's initiative. We had put ourselves in the peculiar position of asking for negotiation and then going through a long and laborious process to find out what we wanted to negotiate about.

Quid Pro Quo?

After all the study and all the reports and all the missions, the Pentagon came up with a very realistic appraisal of what the Spanish military capabilities were worth to us. It was so realistic that we might have thought twice before taking the initiative if we had seen the appraisal at the start. In effect, the closer the Americans looked at the situation in Spain, the less eager they became.

At first sight, Franco's twenty-two so-called divisions looked tempting to the U.S. Army. But more intimate inspection proved disillusioning. The Spanish Army had been born in civil war, and it was still good for little more than civil war. To modernize it would mean creating a virtually new army, military economy, and transportation system. I saw more soldiers on the streets in Spain than anywhere else in Europe. The officers look proud and immaculate down to their gleaming white gloves. But the rank-and-file soldiers wear ragged, smelly, and dirty uniforms such as few other armies tolerate.

Before Franco's army could contribute anything to help us, we would have to contribute much more, relatively speaking, to help it than we have had to do elsewhere in western Europe, because the Spanish economy is so much weaker. Since we were falling short of our existing military requirements, the prospect of taking on immensely difficult and expensive new obligations in Spain was appalling.

The U.S. Army was never particularly interested in making over the Spanish Army. The pressure for a Spanish tie-up came primarily from our Navy and Air Force. These two services were chiefly interested in obtaining bases for themselves in what they considered an admirably located strategic position. If only bases were involved, they argued, our problems would be minimum and our benefits maximum.

At one stage, owing to Admiral Sherman's driving role, the Navy's stake in the Spanish negotiations seemed uppermost. Some admirals advocated a military link with almost indiscreet eagerness. For example, Vice-Admiral Matthias B. Gardner, commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, went out on a limb by proclaiming that "naval bases in Spain are indispensable."

But, as has happened so often in these negotiations, the big talk was premature. Just before they began, Admiral William M. Fechteler, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, made a statement to clear the air. He explained that we were merely seeking mooring rights or "floating facilities" in Spain, not control of bases. Obviously the Navy had taken a second look and had decided to stay out of Spain itself. Mooring rights was rather a comedown from the U.S. Sixth Fleet's original demand for a "home port" in the Mediterranean.

This left the ball in the hands of the Air Force. General Spry, who headed our information mission, and Major General August W. Kissner, who heads the military negotiating group, are both Air Force men. What we now want boils down primarily to airbases.

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The Air Force has a collector's passion for bases in general and a natural leaning toward strategically placed Spanish bases in particular. In 1950-1951, however, when a full-scale war had to be feared, there was no way of getting bases in Spain speedily and there was an alternative site not far away. Just across the narrow neck of the Mediterranean, five huge airbases are rising in Morocco at very high and highly publicized cost. These have not dulled the Air Force's appetite for more of the same in Spain, but the latter could be a wasteful luxury if the price were too high.

What could we offer Spain in return for bases? Congress authorized an additional $100 million for Spain in October, 1951. Not a cent of this money could be given to Spain without the signing of a mutual security agreement—that is, before the successful outcome of the present negotiations. Another $25 million in military equipment is also being held up for the same reason. At the moment, as one American negotiator put it, "that is all we have in the kitty." But undoubtedly there is much more where that came from if Spain gives us what we want: Spanish bases in exchange for American economic aid.

It is just as important to know what this formula rules out. We are not offering an alliance. We are talking about an "administrative agreement" on specific points of mutual interest.

'Bases—Never!'

I had one conversation with a Spaniard which seemed to me to sum up the Spanish reaction to our proposal. When I asked about his attitude toward Spanish-American co-operation in general, he said forcefully:

"I assure you that ninety per cent of the Spanish people are enthusiastic about an understanding with the United States. We need capital more than anything else, and only you can provide it."

I remarked that this left out the military side of the matter entirely. He became much more grave and replied:

"Everyone knows that our army is weak in matériel. But the Spanish soldier is brave and the Spanish soldier is excellent. If you give us the necessary equipment, we will defend Spain to the last man."

But what about the American demand for bases, which after all was the main point? At this there was a moment of hesitation, followed by an emotional outburst:

"Impossible! Spain cannot permit anyone to have bases on its soil. Do you know what the man in the street is saying? 'Two or three American bases mean two or three more Gibral-

tars.' Money—yes! Army—yes! Bases —never!"

His parting shot was: "The trouble with your people is that they are asking for exactly what Spain cannot give."

This is merely a rather blunt version of the attitude that our negotiators are up against.

In the Spanish military setup, the army is supreme. It is many times larger and far more potent politically than the navy and air force combined. It is the very foundation of Franco's power. As an old army man himself, Franco's first concern must be to satisfy the army, which always expects to get the lion's share of the spoils. If bases are all that we want, there could not be so much in it for the army. In fact, we would want to use our own equipment under our own operational control in any Spanish bases.

What the Franco régime wants, in short, is equipment for its own armed forces. It looks with envy at the money and equipment which our west European Allies have received. It even considers bases the most dangerous form of Spanish involvement in any future crisis. This is the reasoning:

The NATO powers, whether they like it or not, have to defend Spain on the ground. France sits athwart the land routes to Spain. The western navies control the sea routes. Spain does not have to pay anything for these services. They are the gifts of geography.

But the danger from the air is something else. On land, Spain can be attacked only in the last stage of a European war; from the air, it can be attacked in the first stage. American bases would constitute a provocative invitation to the enemy to hammer Spain, or at least the bases, from the air. They would expose Spain just where it is most vulnerable.

Conclusion: The risks involved in the bases are maximum, the recompense to Spain's own military establishment minimum.

Haggling

Against these risks, the Spaniards are not impressed by our offer of economic aid. An American observer said to me:

"We may have missed the boat here. Two years ago, Franco's need for economic aid was desperate. Spain had six years of drought which ruined its agriculture and crippled its industry. To make matters worse, Perón cut off Franco's credit in 1950 because Argentina was getting into trouble. Famine was behind the riots in Barcelona and Madrid in the spring of 1951.

"But Franco was lucky again. The rains came just in the nick of time. They came again this year. You can see for yourself. The shops are full of goods. Some people must have enough money these days to buy them. For the moment, there's enough food. Of course, Franco has nothing to fall back on. He has no reserve. One bad year and the country will be back where it was. Franco still wants our money, sure, but he doesn't need it as much as he did two years ago."

THE Sufrin economic mission was a grave disappointment to the Spaniards. Professor Sufrin came to the conclusion that the United States should not invest more than $150 million annually over a three-year period in Spain. He has written: ". . . Spain is in no position to digest a large investment fund even if such were available."

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I brought up Professor Sufrin's figure in an interview with one of the chief Spanish economic negotiators. His reaction was: "I agree with Professor Sufrin in principle. Spain's 'digestive capacity' must be considered. But $300 million a year would be closer to the truth. Professor Sufrin's figure was much too low for us."

Incidentally, this same man proved much more interested in Spain's earning more dollars with exports than in getting even double the Sufrin figure.

On the surface, the negotiation has been conducted in an atmosphere like that of an Oriental bazaar. Every time we make a bid, the price goes up. We want one thing—bases—and they want altogether different things—planes, tanks, guns, and dollars. But there is a limit to horse trading. There are some things which, in terms of national interest, money cannot buy.

For the Spaniards, the crucial issue is the risk of involvement in a European or general war. They always say loftily that they will fight to the last man if they are attacked. This may be so, but it is rather beside the point. The vital queston is whether they will wait to be attacked in order to fight. In that case, they will fight only after all our Allies in western Europe have been overrun. They will fight, in other words, a last-ditch action for themselves.

On our side, we already have one defense system in operation in western Europe. It is simply out of the question to have two defense systems—a big one in NATO and a little one reserved for Spain alone. It is absolutely unthinkable that the little one based on the weakest economy in Europe should come into play after the big one has been smashed. In the end, in one way or another, the two have to be linked. Our negotiators assured me that they understood this thoroughly.

But we are up against the tremendous weight of Spanish tradition and a special kind of Spanish neutralism almost in the national grain. Except for short, abortive intervals, Spain has been running away from Europe for four hundred years. No Spaniard can forget or ignore the advantages of having stayed out of the last two World Wars. Neutralism in Europe may be anti-American; in Spain it is anti-European.

In the very midst of these negotiations, Foreign Minister Martín Artajo chose July 18, the anniversary of the outbreak of the Franco rebellion, as an occasion for feeding this characteristic xenophobia. All Spanish papers published an interview in which he hailed Franco as "the true protagonist of our epic resistance to foreign intervention." Not since the Treaty of Utrecht [1713!], he said, had Spain enjoyed such a firm "position of independence." All the sacrifices of the Spanish people were justified because Franco had "emancipated" them from "foreign tutelage."

Diplomatic Double Talk

It was not hard for Spanish readers to translate these allusions into present-day terms. The Franco régime has more openly intimated that the present negotiations with the United States threaten Spain with the latest form of foreign intervention and tutelage. Since neither side has put its cards on the table, a kind of diplomatic double talk has developed, especially in the obedient Spanish press.

One uninhibited Spanish diplomat smilingly "translated" a stock Spanish phrase as follows: "If we are complaining that the United States must treat Spain as an equal, you should understand that it is because we feel keenly that a small and poor country like Spain cannot engage in bipartite negotiations with a big and rich country like the United States without being put at a distinct disadvantage."

Franco went through all of this with Hitler. He negotiated. He signed agreements. He accepted military and economic aid. He made boastful speeches of loyalty. But when Hitler in his hour of need wanted to march through Spain to get to Gibraltar, Franco found one good reason after another to refuse to go that far. Franco promised Hitler a million "volunteers" to save Berlin. He sent a single division to the Eastern Front, and German records show that the division cost more than it was worth.

The fruits of war without the risks of war remains Franco's fundamental policy. Franco has made up his mind that he will not permit any American bases in Spain comparable to our bases in western Europe or Morocco. Of course, he will accept all the money and military equipment he can get. Whatever diplomatic formula may be found to cover up the fiasco—and I suspect that even this purely technical feat may not be easy—we shall have to be satisfied with faith, hope, and charity. We shall not get more out of Franco than Hitler did, and Hitler lived long enough to become bitterly disillusioned with his Spanish ally despite the fact that Franco owed infinitely more to Hitler than he owes to us. Too much of the discussion on our side has assumed that all we have to do is to decide whether we want to have anything to do with Franco Spain. It may come as a shock to many people to learn that the Franco régime is not quite sure that it wants to have anything to do with us.

The next President of the United States has a vast collection of crises waiting in ambush for him. One of the first to come out of hiding will be the U.S.-Spanish negotiation. Franco has been getting more and more impatient, and only the proximity of our election has delayed a demand for a showdown. Franco told an Italian newspaperman about two years ago: "The American people are an excessively simple people who are easily deceived." The question is whether the next President of the United States will have the courage and conviction to prove that Franco does not know us.

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Origins of McCarthyism

I—A Historic Parallel

KARL MEYER

THE STATE of Wisconsin, once called the "Ideal Commonwealth" by Lincoln Steffens, is best known for its exports. These include cheese, beer, and Senator Joseph Raymond McCarthy.

To many who remember only the glories of the "Ideal Commonwealth," McCarthy's present eminence seems somewhat perplexing. For years the state was associated with the image of "Fighting Bob" La Follette flaying the trusts with his horsewhip oratory. The fact that La Follette's Senate seat is now held by a jingoist ex-Marine seems incongruous to some observers.

But to those who are intimately familiar with the past vagaries of Badger State politics, the emergence of McCarthy is less surprising. For over half a century, Wisconsin has had a bad case of "political schizophrenia" (to poach a phrase from Governor Stevenson). Joe McCarthy is the second politician of his type in recent years to bubble up from Wisconsin's factional ferment into wider notoriety.

Wisconsin's first McCarthy was a stentorian young editor from Ashland, who was hailed as the scourge of the Progressives until Wisconsin voters retired him to deserved obscurity in his home town in the windy north of the state. His name is John B. Chapple.

Mr. Chapple, thrice a Republican Senatorial hopeful, established during the 1930's a personal patent on almost every technique that Senator McCarthy was later to perfect with far more explosive results.

It was John Chapple's fate to pay the penalty of the pioneer; he entered the lists when the forces of decency were stronger, and this deplorable timing resulted in his consignment to Limbo. Whereas it took Senator McCarthy until 1949 to find that Communists lurked under almost every desk in Washington, John Chapple made a similar discovery in 1931.

The occasion for Chapple's awakening at the age of thirty-two was a legislative hearing on a tax bill sponsored by the then Governor Philip F. La Follette. Chapple journeyed to Madison to testify against the bill, which he thought would hurt his home town. For his efforts, he was heckled by Progressive legislators. Apparently the experience was traumatic. As he later explained to a New York *Herald Tribune* reporter:

"For the first time, I came to realize that the La Follettes were using the same methods as the Soviets except that there were no machine guns."

Prior to this startling discovery, Chapple had been content to reign as a minor social lion in Ashland (pop. 10,640), where he was the managing editor of his father's newspaper, the Ashland *Press*. During the early 1920's, Chapple had graduated from Yale "pink as a lobster," by his own admission. He had even been offered a berth on the *Daily Worker*. A visit to Russia after his graduation not only quenched his radicalism but established him as an expert in sniffing out Stalinists.

All This and Free Love

When Chapple thought he discerned a likeness between Lenin and the younger La Follettes in 1931, he was not shy about publicizing his discovery.

In much the same manner that Senator McCarthy found his foil in the State Department, Chapple found his in the University of Wisconsin. In November, 1931, the young editor denounced sixteen of the university's most famous professors and confided to a jeering student audience that the faculty members were "Socialist and Communist sympathizers who have no right to their pay checks because they are attacking the very system that supports them."

Among the accused were educator Alexander Meiklejohn, philosopher Max Otto, sociologist Edward Alsworth Ross, poet William Ellery Leonard, and labor economist Selig Perlman. None were Communists; most were vigorous liberals.

Chapple reserved the Acheson-like role of supervillain for the State University's president, the late Glenn Frank, a mild and voluble Whiggish liberal who was later to help write the 1940 Republican platform. According to Chapple, under President Frank the university had become a hotbed of "atheism, socialism and communism." Chapple later threw in "free love."

Chapple's technique as self-appointed prosecutor has been made boringly familiar to the nation by McCarthy. The *Herald Tribune* reported that after Chapple made a charge, "He brandished documents to prove the connection of faculty members with the American Civil Liberties Union, the Victor Berger Foundation and other organizations which he characterized as communistic."

The call to public office was not far

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off. In April, 1932, after a Washington luncheon with Herbert Hoover, Chapple announced that he would run for the Senate. With a straight face he observed, "It is time the poison peddlers were driven for cover."

His opponent in the Republican primary was a political heavyweight: John J. Blaine, incumbent Senator, former Governor, and a widely known La Follette supporter. Chapple was undaunted, because he had the endorsement of the state party organization that was later to launch McCarthy's career.

At a typical campaign meeting near Milwaukee, he screamed, "What do you think of a La Follette University faculty which teaches your children that there is no God?"

The first results of the technique were frightening. Although no one had heard of Chapple the year before, he upset the veteran Progressive politician in a Republican primary in the same way that McCarthy was later to beat Young Bob La Follette in 1946.

By the grace of Franklin Roosevelt's popularity, the nation was spared John Chapple. Although Wisconsin had gone Democratic only twice since the Civil War, F.D.R. swept the state and carried into office the Democratic Senatorial candidate, F. Ryan Duffy.

After 1932, Chapple's career was anticlimactic. In 1934 he was again chosen as a Republican Senatorial candidate. Despite a red-covered, photostat-crammed volume entitled *The La Follette Road to Communism,* Chapple was overwhelmed by Senator Robert M. La Follette, Jr. Chapple's last serious try for the Senate was made in 1938, when he was beaten by Alexander Wiley, currently Wisconsin's senior Senator.

John Chapple's voice was not completely stilled after his third defeat. New hope came to the Ashland editor when Joseph McCarthy proved himself capable of doing what Chapple couldn't by beating La Follette.

Perhaps out of pique at his political descendant's successful mimicry of his techniques, Chapple presently bobbed out of obscurity to make a charge that outdid anything that McCarthy has offered so far.

On April 14, 1952, the Associated Press announced that John Chapple had resigned from the presidency of Fighters for MacArthur, a letterhead organization he had formed a year earlier, to organize a new group, the National Committee to Expose the Pro-Soviet Forces Behind Eisenhower.

But once more Chapple paid the price of being a pioneer. He had announced that Colonel Robert R. McCormick of the Chicago *Tribune* was an honorary vice-president of his organization, but when interviewed in Chicago, the Colonel denied it, saying, "I don't know that the Soviet forces are behind General Eisenhower."

Chapple had more luck with another vice-president, Dr. Emmanuel M. Josephson of New York. Josephson, acting for N.C.E.P.F.B.E., almost broke up a New York press conference for Eisenhower in June, 1952, by demanding that the General explain his friendship with Alger Hiss. According to the New York *Times:* "Before Dr. Josephson had finished the question, the General interrupted, his eyes blazing and his face flushing, to ask, 'What's that you say? What's that you say?' "

But apparently Chapple's qualms about Eisenhower were finally relieved in some way or other. In September he announced the formation of his latest, and presumably final, organization for this year: Fighters for MacArthur Now Fighting for Eisenhower. Whether the nominee has accepted the services of F.F.M.N.F.F.E. is not ascertainable.

Hopeful Parallel?

Although Chapple and McCarthy are linked neither by friendship nor blood, the parallels in their careers are interesting: Both have been champions of the Republican Stalwart faction in Wisconsin; both have exemplified the frustration that can drive "respectable" Republicans into an alliance with the goon squads of hate. The bitterness that arose from the factional fight in Wisconsin politics between the La Follettes and the Stalwarts created the atmosphere in which Chapple and McCarthy built political careers. Only one parallel is lacking—and the citizenry of Wisconsin may remedy this in November.

II—A Soviet Footnote

H. B. DAVID

The Soviet custom of having invented everything—past, present, and future—continues unabated. A short time ago, as the news dispatches told us, they invented the American game of baseball in Russia—*beizbol,* or *lapta*—seven centuries ago. The week before that, at a meeting of the All-Soviet Presidium for Pre-Invention and Post-Fabrication, it was almost unanimously decided that the Russians had invented gunpowder.

One member objected mildly that the Chinese had some sort of inventing priority on gunpowder, and that in view of the fact that the Chinese were currently allies, their inventing claims ought not to be unduly flouted. The Presidium got around that situation, however, by promptly claiming that the Russians had invented China, thereby taking in Confucius and Manchuria as well as gunpowder.

This week's news is even more interesting. It turns out, according to the latest Moscow advices, that the current American phenomenon of McCarthyism is not really American at all, but is an ancient creation of Russian genius, pilfered from the Kremlin by certain spies and vandals from the State of Wisconsin.

It all came up at a meeting in the Presidium inventing chamber, where the comrade scientists were exploring possible ancient Russian discoveries under the letter "M." A comrade tactlessly mentioned with envy the new American miracle weapon called *Ma-*

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karti-ism, which, in his words, "blasted an enemy with a barrage of accusations so preposterous that they paralyzed the victim."

The comrade, according to the accounts, had no sooner made his remarks when there was a storm of protests in the Presidium. Scientists jumped on their chairs and laboratory tables and shouted that *Makarti-ism* was a strictly Russian invention, and that the comrade should undergo immediate trial, confession, and execution for not having known this. It was pointed out by several speakers in rapid-fire succession that *Makarti-ism,* so called, was simply the old Russian practice of *Izba-ism* (*izba* is a hut, or shanty), which in its more primitive form consisted of flinging mud from the *izba* at all passersby.

Later, as the speakers were careful to indicate, it was discovered that the *izba* mud had miraculous political powers. The magnificent Rurik applied it in the ninth century against the foes of Russia, and the mighty Comrade Czar Ivan the Terrible was masterful in his use of it for squelching the capitalistic boyars and their bourgeois lackeys.

"The first great modern developer of *Izba-ism,* which the American thieves call *Makarti-ism,* was our saintly Lenin," said one speaker. "It was his mightiest weapon. The opponent, especially the Socialist opponent, was denounced by Lenin as a scrofulous lackey in the pay of the Romanoffs. He had betrayed the people; he had led the Cossack police in their wholesale massacres of women and children. He was the secret governor of the Bank of England, and he never slept at night because he was too busy counting the *valuta* he had received for his numerous betrayals. Lenin's great and beloved disciple, our saintly Stalin, went even further in the development of *Izba-ism.* Who does not recall how effectively our great Stalin used that weapon against the vile Trotsky?"

There were loud and prolonged cheers. The little comrade who had introduced the subject of *Makarti-ism* should have been completely squelched by this time, but he displayed, inexplicably, a sudden rash of stubbornness. "Just the same," he said, "there are certain elements of this *Makarti-ism* in America that are new and ought to be considered. For example, they have a great and beloved general in America, General Marshall. But with *Makarti-ism* they were able to prove in just a few hours in Congress that this General Marshall, in spite of his being a national idol, was a despicable traitor who had sold his country to us. Only a few hours, comrades! I am sure you will agree that this is a remarkably swift process, and ought to be invented by us at once."

Izba-izing Tukachevsky

"Marshall!" jeered a comrade. "He is still alive, isn't he? Some people in America still respect him, don't they? According to Tass, he is even taking a vacation. Do you recall what happened to Marshal Tukachevsky when *he* was *Izba-ized?* A hitherto obscure prosecutor named Vishinsky was assigned to *Izba-ize* the Marshal. And what did Vishinsky do? He branded Tukachevsky as a traitor, a capitalistic plotter, even a German. He proved that Tukachevsky had never won a single battle, that in fact Tukachevsky had always been very disappointed and bitter every time his armies won in spite of him, because those victories were defeating his secret capitalist program to destroy the Soviet Union. The battles had really been won by Stalin.

"And what happened?" the speaker cried triumphantly. "Tukachevsky was dead the next day. Dead! Not alive and taking a vacation, like Marshall. *Makarti-ism!* An American can steal our inventions, but he will never be able to use them as we do. Nevertheless, the theft must be punished." And he cast a baleful glance at the unfortunate little comrade who had brought up the subject.

The aftermath was exceedingly orthodox. Within an hour the little comrade was brought to trial. After a grueling examination lasting thirty-six hours, he confessed all. It was he, he admitted, who had stolen *Izba-ism,* converted it to *Makarti-ism,* and had shipped it to a cousin in Milwaukee. They took him down to a cellar of the Kremlin, where an MVD professor taught him English in preparation for his public confession.

However, as was learned from a secret deviationist, there was no public confession. The matter, it seemed, had been brought to the attention of Stalin himself. The old philosopher promptly wrote a policy statement, in the form of an answer to an otherwise unidentified Comrade Jerashenko. Stalin wrote: "Comrade Jerashenko asks, rather obtusely, if *Makarti-ism* is an American invention. The answer is: Certainly. Comrade Jerashenko should be more careful."

There was instituted a swift hunt for Comrade Jerashenko, in order to make him more careful, but the search was fruitless, for the files of the MVD disclosed that a severe admonition had already been administered to a Comrade Jerashenko some five years earlier, and he was no longer on hand to be admonished again. The next step was a rapid ideological interpretation of Stalin's statement by the Soviet Union's most perceptive minds. Plainly the statement presaged a new policy. It was decided, finally, that what Stalin wanted was for America to go on believing in *Makarti-ism* as an American invention, and for Americans to be encouraged to go on practicing it as much as possible. It was something they could never do as well as the Communists, but it would add much to a desired confusion. To make certain that Americans would take *Makarti-ism* to their hearts, *Pravda* was instructed to publish a blistering editorial denouncing *Makarti-ism* as a diabolical American weapon.

That, however, was not the end of it. A new policy in the Soviet Union always means new personnel, together with a suitable disposal of the old personnel. Those members of the All-Soviet Presidium for Pre-Invention and Post-Fabrication who had claimed *Markarti-ism* as a Russian invention were speedily dispatched to the Kremlin cellar.

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Bernard Berenson, Indomitable Spirit

GOUVERNEUR PAULDING

RUMOR AND REFLECTION, by Bernard Berenson. *Simon and Schuster.* $6.

WHEN A MAN has spent a lifetime as a specialist—in this case a lifetime trying to learn more than anyone else has ever known about Italian painting—he is apt to feel himself above, or at any rate outside, the politics, the economics, and the wars in which his contemporaries engage. He is apt to live in a serene and private world, and it is interesting to see what he will think when trouble comes and his world is ruined. Living in his Florentine villa as he had been living—"graciously" is the horrid word—for many years, Bernard Berenson was seventy-five when Italy entered the Second World War. His diary covers the years 1941-1944.

Rumor and Reflection could justifiably have been replete and tedious with lamentation over the annoyances that wartime brings even to the privileged; it could have insisted disproportionately, when the fighting approached and then engulfed Florence, upon the immediate danger to the diarist's life; it could have dwelt excusably on the even more tormenting threat that the author might be deported to Germany as an American, and moreover a Jew. The threat was a real one in the chaotic days that followed Italy's military collapse. One might have expected that this old man—"All in all, I belong to the premachine age"—would seek refuge in his memories.

THIS DIARY shows instead that Bernard Berenson's security is equal to all annoyance, his unspoken courage a match for any threat, his vision with surprising lucidity directed forward. Here is that thing called humanism, removed from the textbooks and from theory, operating in a man's life.

No Hitlerian horror, no fascist savagery, no Allied bombs can detach Berenson from his feeling of closeness, of oneness with the minds that had nourished his thought. He rereads Shakespeare and Shelley, Leopardi, Racine, Schiller and Goethe. Like the Frenchman André Gide, and no doubt like other men of good will in America and Great Britain, he turns again and again to Goethe for reassurance that there can be no peoples damned and excluded from humanity. But with Berenson this long view is no sanction for indifference or detachment. Reading Goethe, he weeps that the Germans have Hitler, and the Italians, the people he loves best in the world, have Mussolini: "For twenty years I have been telling them [his American compatriots] that Mussolini meant disaster, meant war. . . . They . . . retain the vague memory that I was inopportune and therefore not practical in politics."

AND now the Americans are pressing North to Rome, and this war has to be won, even if Monte Cassino has to go—it can be replaced; it is neither antique nor beautiful—even if the irreplaceable has to go, for Nazism is the "last phase of the intermittent, ever-renewed attempt of partially Romanized Germany to shake itself free of Mediterranean influence." That attempt must be defeated.

In the long view the war may be a detail, but no one can shirk the detail of immediate duty. Suddenly Berenson is thinking about the distant future and how small the Anglo-American campaign for the Italian peninsula will appear in perspective. "If mankind survives another five thousand years . . . we now living and acting will seem to people of that distant date to have belonged to what we call 'antiquity.' Should anyone question this, he will be advised to look at . . . how much that combination of Jewish religion, Greek metaphysics, and Roman imperialism known as Christianity dominates us still . . ." Ours is only the "present phase of the antique world." In the unpredictable future "the least changed will remain man himself," with his aspirations toward the good, the true, and the beautiful. Man's task is to fight all that impedes these aspirations. Hitler must go, but as early as 1942 Berenson writes that the ultimate threat to the Mediterranean-Atlantic world will come from Russia.

AGAIN AND AGAIN Berenson interrupts himself to describe the changing seasons and the Tuscan earth, or a peasant girl will remind him of one of his dearly loved paintings—but he is never pedantic in his pictorial references: "Toward noon it was almost hot in the sun and not cold in the shade. We climbed the hill covered with bottle-green cypresses, and oaks retaining their leafage bleached to the color of pale bronze. . . . Paths crisscrossed every way. Indeed, the whole of Italy is cobwebbed with the traces of immemorial treading of human footsteps. Returning I reveled in the sight of the oranges glowing golden on their trees. . . ."

Then this professional aesthete, this cloistered cataloguer of paintings—but also this ever watchful political analyst—looks out over the domed city of Florence and beyond Florence at Europe. He sees that the name "Europe" no longer defines the western tip of Asia but all the free world. It is this "Greater" Europe that is charged now with making it possible for humanism to retain and enrich the heritage of the past.

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

FARTHER AND FARTHER INTO THE MISTS . . .

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